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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LENDING AND
INCREASING RETURNS TO SCALE
by
Thomas Jack Snyder
Florida International University, 2010
Miami, Florida
Professor Cem Karayalcin, Major Professor
Standard economic theory suggests that capital should flow from rich countries to
poor countries. However, capital has predominantly flowed to rich countries. The three
essays in this dissertation attempt to explain this phenomenon. The first two essays
suggest theoretical explanations for why capital has not flowed to the poor countries.
The third essay empirically tests the theoretical explanations.
The first essay examines the effects of increasing returns to scale on international
lending and borrowing with moral hazard. Introducing increasing returns in a twocountry general equilibrium model yields possible multiple equilibria and helps explain
the possibility of capital flows from a poor to a rich country. I find that a borrowing
country may need to borrow sufficient amounts internationally to reach a minimum
investment threshold in order to invest domestically.
The second essay examines how a poor country may invest in sectors with low
productivity because of sovereign risk, and how collateral differences across sectors may
exacerbate the problem. I model sovereign borrowing with a two-sector economy: one
sector with increasing returns to scale (IRS) and one sector with diminishing returns to
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scale (DRS). Countries with incomes below a threshold will only invest in the DRS
sector, and countries with incomes above a threshold will invest mostly in the IRS sector.
The results help explain the existence of a bimodal world income distribution.
The third essay empirically tests the explanations for why capital has not flowed
from the rich to the poor countries, with a focus on institutions and initial capital. I find
that institutional variables are a very important factor, but in contrast to other studies, I
show that institutions do not account for the Lucas Paradox. Evidence of increasing
returns still exists, even when controlling for institutions and other variables. In addition,
I find that the determinants of capital flows may depend on whether a country is rich or
poor.
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I. INTERNATIONAL LENDING WITH INCREASING RETURNS AND MORAL
HAZARD
I.I. Introduction
Increasing returns to capital continues to be an active research area given the
empirical support it has garnered in recent studies. It is interesting to note, for example,
that the 2008 World Development Report, when referring to agriculture emphasizes the
importance of increasing returns. Thus, we read that although “many international and
national investments in R&D have paid off handsomely, with an average internal rate of
return of 43 percent in 700 R&D projects evaluated in developing countries in all
regions,” in Sub-Saharan Africa investment was considerably lower in part because the
“small size of many of these countries prevents them from capturing economies of scale
in agricultural R&D … For these countries, sharply increased investment and regional
cooperation in R&D are urgent” (p. 14-15). The evidence, such as the above example,
also suggests that with increasing returns, there are low returns at low levels of
investment.
Further, previous studies have suggested that there are increasing returns to
infrastructure and manufacturing. Rodriguez (2008) finds evidence of increasing returns
to manufacturing across nations. The empirical work on infrastructure and IT in the U.S.
by Duggal, Saltzman, and Klein (1999, 2007) supports initial increasing returns.
Fingleton and McCombie (1998) find evidence of increasing returns in EU
manufacturing. Oliveira, Jayme, Jr., and Lemos (2006) find evidence of increasing
returns in manufacturing in Brazil, and Park and Kwon (1995) find support for economies
of scale in Korean manufacturing.
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The literature on the effects of increasing returns to scale is vast, including a large
literature on poverty traps. Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) popularized the idea that a “big
push” was necessary for some countries to take advantage of economies of scale. Many
theoretical studies have shown since how a big push or collaborative effort is needed to
move out of an equilibrium with low growth rates. For instance, Murphy, Shleifer, and
Vishney (1989) and Azariadis and Stachurski (2004) provide an extensive analysis of
these poverty traps. However, empirical tests of poverty traps have not substantiated the
theory. Comparing the poorest quintile to the richest quintile of countries, Easterly
(2006) finds that most poverty trap hypotheses are not robustly supported by the data.
Rodriquez (2008) finds increasing returns to manufacturing, but does not find robust
evidence for multiple equilibria. Although the evidence is debatable whether a big push
of funds increases income per capita, the general belief is that a big push is necessary for
some economies to get out of poverty traps. As described in Easterly (2006), 2005 was
“the Year of the Big Push,” as there was an international effort to meet the eight
Millennium Development Goals for improvements in social and economic indicators in
developing countries by the year 2015, which has led to an emphasis on foreign aid.
Despite all this literature on increasing returns, studies of its effects on
international lending and borrowing are conspicuous by their absence. Studies have
tended to focus on explaining why we might see increasing returns, such as human
capital differences or institutional quality, but not many have actually modeled the effects
of increasing returns on lending and borrowing.

In one exception, Spiegel (1995)

introduces increasing returns in a sovereign debt model and finds that the equilibrium
credit constraint as a share of the capital stock is increasing in the capital stock, and
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increasing returns enhances the potential for long-term lending strategies. The setup in
this paper differs from Spiegel in several aspects, asymmetric information and
uncertainty is introduced, and the focus is on equilibrium investment levels, perverse
capital flows, and equilibrium interest rates. Here, increasing returns to capital yield
thresholds along with the possibility of multiple equilibria, which is consistent with the
increasing-returns literature.
Introducing asymmetric information between the lender and borrower, along with
the possibility of capital flight, gives rise to a moral hazard problem. The issue of moral
hazard has been discussed extensively in the literature on international lending and
borrowing, and especially in regards to the IMF (Atkeson, 1991; Corsetti, Guimaraes, and
Roubini, 2006; Gertler & Rogoff, 1990; Lane, 1999). Most of this literature, however,
unlike the present paper, restricts attention to an environment with constant returns.
This paper models international lending and borrowing with increasing marginal
returns to capital, in a setup characterized by the presence of moral hazard. I show how
this environment can give rise to thresholds, multiple equilibria, perverse international
capital flows, and interest rates that lie outside the interval of autarky rates. A small
country set-up and a two-country case are examined. Asymmetric information and the
possibility of capital flight, which create inefficient investment, are incorporated in the
analysis. The model extends that of Gertler and Rogoff (1990), which only examines the
case of diminishing marginal returns.
This paper is organized as follows. In section II., I set up the model for a small
open economy. I find that introducing increasing returns to investment, combined with
the problem of moral hazard, helps to further explain why there might be suboptimal
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borrowing or lending.

In section III., I set up a two-country model and find that

increasing returns may yield multiple equilibria and help explain why we could see
capital flows from the poor to the rich country. In fact, contrary to statements in Gertler
and Rogoff (1990), I show that under diminishing returns, funds must flow from the poor
to the rich country as the capital account is liberalized. In section IV., I simulate the twocountry model to help illustrate the results. 1

I also show how introducing initial

increasing returns with free international capital mobility can lead to equilibrium interest
rates that lie outside the interval of autarky interest rates. This stands in contrast to the
standard result with diminishing returns, where equilibrium interest rates under capital
mobility lie between the autarky levels. Section V. concludes.
I.II. Model for a Small Open Economy
To see the effects of increasing returns to scale on borrowing and lending, I use
the model introduced in Gertler and Rogoff (1990). 2 I first look at a small country that
faces the gross world interest rate RW (or 1 + r W , where r W is the net interest rate). I
assume that the country is populated by entrepreneurs who live for two periods. They
invest in period 1 and consume only in period 2.

This allows us to focus on the

investment story and abstract from the effects of consumption smoothing, without losing
any major insights. I assume the representative entrepreneur is risk neutral with the
linear utility function:

U (C1 , C2 ) = C2 .

(1)

1

For a good discussion on why computations are useful, see Judd (1997)

2

I use a slightly simpler version from the textbook of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996).
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In the first period, the entrepreneur receives an exogenous endowment of Y1 , which can
be either invested abroad at the world riskless interest rate RW or invested in a risky
domestic firm. Investment in the domestic firm at level I yields an output Y2 distributed
as follows:

Z with probability π ( I )
Y2 = 
0 with probability 1 − π ( I )

(2)

I assume π ' ( I ) > 0 for all levels of investment; however, unlike Gertler and
Rogoff (1990), I assume π ' ' ( I ) > 0 for low levels of investment and π ' ' ( I ) < 0 for high
levels of investment. I look at the case where initial levels of investment have increasing
returns to scale. We should, however, eventually expect the marginal returns to be
diminishing after some critical investment level. The main contribution of this paper is to
analyze what are the implications that initial increasing returns to investment may have
on international lending and borrowing with moral hazard. The assumption in this model
is that the source of the increasing returns is internal to the firm, but alternatively one can
view the returns as external and assume that the borrower is the government and social
planner.
The entrepreneurs would like to maximize the present value of their expected
return on their home investment minus the investment, i.e.,

−I +

π ( I )Z
RW

.

(3)

The first-order condition of this maximization problem is

π ' ( I )Z = RW .

(4)
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For the case of diminishing returns to investment, some investment level I is the unique
solution to the maximization problem. With initial increasing returns to investment, we
can have two investment levels that satisfy the first-order condition, where the higher of
those two levels achieves the maximum value from domestic investment. Note that in the
diminishing-returns model it is assumed π ' (0) Z > R W to ensure that a positive level of
investment is efficient under symmetric information. I assume that the initial returns are
low π ' (0) Z < R W , which may be more realistic, especially in big projects such as
infrastructure, and which also explains why the poorest countries are not getting enough
investment in such projects (such as the R&D example mentioned earlier). A positive
level of domestic investment can still be assured under symmetric information if the
marginal returns eventually surpass the world rate enough to make up for the initial low
returns.
Figure I.1. shows the expected marginal return on domestic investment, π ' ( I ) Z ,
and the return from investing in riskless world securities, RW . I assume that π ' ' ( I ) > 0
~

~

for I < I and π ' ' ( I ) < 0 for I > I , where I define the investment level labeled

~

I as the

investment level where the marginal returns to domestic investment switch from
~

increasing to decreasing. I also assume π ' ( I ) Z > RW , to guarantee some investment
levels in the domestic firms yield higher marginal rates of return than the world rate.
While I placed the intercept for the domestic returns at the origin, a country with some
infrastructure or industry buildup would have an intercept nearer to the world rate. The
two investment levels I and I are where the expected return to domestic investment
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equals the riskless world return. As will be shown in the following sections, the efficient
investment level will not be achieved under asymmetric information, and when combined
with increasing returns, then little or no domestic investment may occur.
Incentive Compatibility
Before solving for the possible loan contracts, I must define the incentive
constraints of the borrowers and lenders. Define L as the amount of funds that the
domestic entrepreneur may secretly lend abroad instead of at home, and D as the amount
of the loan to the domestic entrepreneur. I define the domestic individual’s period one
finance constraint as

I + L = Y1 + D ,

(5)

where

L ≥ 0 and D ≥ 0 .
If foreign lenders are risk neutral and operate in a competitive market, they earn
the expected return of RW on any loan to an entrepreneur. In the “bad” state of nature,
where Y2 = 0 , no repayment would be possible by the entrepreneurs.

Therefore,

promised payments by the entrepreneurs have to be of the state-contingent form P(Y2 ) ,
where P(0) = 0 and P (Z ) is determined by the lender’s zero profit condition:

π ( I ) P( Z ) = R W ( I − Y1 ) .

(6)

The zero profit condition states that the expected payment give the lenders a return of RW
on their loan, given the entire amount of the loan is domestically invested by the
entrepreneurs. As I will discuss later, in an equilibrium contract, we would expect that
the amount of secret lending by the entrepreneurs, L, will be equal to zero.
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If domestic investment equals I , this would be the first-best borrowing contract.
In the case with initial increasing returns, I is the higher investment level which solves

π ' ( I ) Z = R W . If there is asymmetric information, the borrower is not able to commit
credibly to an investment of I . Alternatively, a lower investment level I also satisfies
the first-order condition, but the borrower is making a lower marginal return than RW on
all of the domestic investment below I . Since the marginal returns begin low, but then
exceed the world interest rate over some range of investment, domestic investment must
be large enough in order for the total return to exceed the return from putting all the funds
in the riskless world asset.
As in Gertler and Rogoff (1990), I assume the following information structure:
The borrower’s first-period endowment Y 1 , gross borrowing D, and second-period
output Y2 , are directly observed by the lender. However, the lender does not directly
observe the first-period investment, I , or the amount of funds, L, that the entrepreneur
may secretly lend abroad in period 1. The borrowers do not choose I and L until the
lenders set the amount and terms of the loan, D and P(Y2 ) . If the “bad” outcome occurs,
the lender cannot prove that the borrower did not use the entire amount of the loan for
domestic investment.
Given the state-contingent payment plan and the possibility of secretly acquiring
foreign assets, the borrowers will try to maximize expected second-period consumption:
EC2 = π ( I )[ Z − P( Z )] + [1 − π ( I )][0 − P(0)] + RW L
= π ( I )[ Z − P( Z )] − [1 − π ( I )]P(0) + RW (Y1 + D − I ) .

8

The first-order condition for an interior maximum with diminishing returns is given by

π ' ( I )[ Z − P( Z ) + P(0)] = RW .

(7)

Note that if the debt payments were the same in both the good and the bad state, there
would be no moral hazard problem since the borrowers would have the incentive of
choosing the efficient level of investment, which satisfies π ' ( I ) Z = R W . However, since
the “bad” state yields nothing, the borrowers cannot repay, so we set P(0) = 0 . Recall
that the optimal contract under commitment is P( Z ) =

R W ( I − Y1 )

π (I )

, which is positive if

Y1 < I . Since expected repayment is positive at the efficient level of investment, the

marginal return π ' ( I ) Z must be must be higher than the world rate RW in order for the
borrower to get a net marginal return of at least RW . Therefore, if offered a loan to invest
the efficient amount, the borrower will instead choose to invest some amount less than
the efficient investment level I in the domestic economy. The intuition is that the lender
agrees to share the risk of a bad outcome whenever P(Z) is different from P(0), and the
borrower has less incentive to invest in the good outcome and secretly lends some money
abroad to earn the sure return R W .
Under increasing returns to investment, there can be two investment levels for a
given expected repayment that sets the net marginal return to the borrowers equal to the
world interest rate. If investment happened to be at the point where the net marginal
return equals the riskless interest rate, then the borrower will be indifferent between
investing domestically and lending at the world rate. However, in this setup the borrower
determines how much to invest, and if the repayment is low enough to give the borrower
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a net marginal return equal to the world rate, the repayment may still be too high to give
the borrower a net total return that would exceed what the borrower could have made
lending everything at the world rate. Since the marginal domestic product starts low,

π ' (0) Z < R W , in order for the borrower to be willing to invest the funds domestically,
there must be a sufficient range and magnitude at which the expected net marginal returns
exceed the world rate, π ' ( I )[ Z − P( Z )] > RW , to get an expected net return from investing
domestically that is higher than investing everything at the world rate,

π ( I )[ Z − P( Z )] ≥ IRW .

(8)

Assuming the domestic marginal returns do sufficiently exceed the world rate enough
such that there exists a positive repayment amount that the borrowers would be willing to
accept, there is no guarantee that such a repayment would be acceptable to the lenders.
Sufficiently poor countries may not be able to contract for funds since the repayment
required by the lenders in the good state may be too large to meet the condition in
equation 8. If the borrower’s income is large enough, we can solve for contracts that are
compatible with both the incentives of the borrower and the lender, which is done in the
next section.
Equilibrium Incentive-Compatible Contracts
I can now solve for the possible incentive-compatible contracts, where both the
borrowers and the lenders expect to earn a return that will give them at least the riskless
return, RW . From the borrower’s first-order condition and equation 8, we can write the
incentive compatibility constraint as
P( Z ) ≤ Min[ Z −

R
RI
,Z −
].
π (I )
π '(I )

(9)
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The incentive constraint says that the expected repayment cannot be too high such that
the borrower could have made a higher return from secretly lending at the world rate, nor
can the repayment be too high such that the net marginal return is lower than the riskless
world asset. Unlike the model with diminishing returns to investment, as explained
below, we have an incentive compatibility constraint that is increasing for low levels of
investment and decreasing for higher levels of investment. Graphically, this is shown in
Figure I.2., where IC(1) is the first condition that must be satisfied in the incentive
constraint, while IC(2) is the second. The portion that satisfies both conditions is the
incentive constraint.
If the domestic marginal product starts out lower than the riskless world rate at
low investment levels, then the borrower will invest domestically only when it can invest
enough funds to get a sufficient amount of higher marginal returns to be worth it. The
borrower’s incentive constraint will intersect the horizontal axis in Figure I.2. when the
expected domestic output equals the total riskless return, π ( I ) Z = IR W , since the
borrower will not agree to any positive repayment for any investment lower than this
level under increasing returns. Once the expected domestic output exceeds the total
return from investing in the riskless asset, the risk-neutral borrower would be willing to
make a positive repayment. Therefore, the slope of the incentive constraint is initially
positive.
The expected repayment acceptable to borrowers, π ( I ) P( Z ) , will increase as
long as the gap between the expected output, π ( I ) Z , and the return on the riskless asset,

IRW , increases. This gap will be at its largest when the marginal domestic return equals
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the world interest rate (the higher I that solves the equation), π ' ( I ) Z = RW . The
acceptable contracted repayment to the borrowers in the good state, P (Z ) , will increase
as long as the net marginal return, π ' ( I )[ Z − P( Z )] , exceeds the world rate RW . Solving
the first condition of the borrower’s incentive constraint in equation (9), Z −

RW I
, for a
π (I )

maximum, we would find that the acceptable repayment is highest when I =

π (I )
. At
π ' (I )

this investment level, P ( Z ) = Z −

RW
, which is the second incentive constraint
π ' (I )

condition, where the expected net marginal return equals the world interest rate. For
investment levels above this level, the borrower’s incentive constraint is now the second
condition in equation (9).
While some higher repayment than specified in the second condition of the
incentive constraint may still give the borrower a higher net total return than lending at
the world rate, the borrower will not repay such an amount that would make the net
marginal return on domestic investment less than the risk-free interest rate. This second
condition of the incentive constraint is increasing under increasing returns and decreasing
under diminishing returns. If the borrower can invest enough domestically such that the
repayment is lower in the second condition, it must be the case that there is decreasing
returns to scale. The expected net total return can be thought of as the average return
given a repayment, which will only catch up to the marginal return if the marginal return
declines.
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Intuitively, the second condition of the incentive constraint in Figure I.2.
intersects the horizontal axis at I and I . Any domestic investment level below I or
above I will provide a marginal return less than the return in the world market, so no
repayment would be acceptable for a borrower. The first condition of the incentive
constraint, IC(1), intersects the horizontal axis when the expected output equals the
expected return that could be made from investing everything in at the riskless rate,

π ( I ) Z = RI . The first intercept of IC(1) comes at a higher investment level than the first
intercept of IC(2) since the total return from investing in the domestic economy will not
exceed the amount that could be made from lending everything at the world rate until the
domestic marginal returns have sufficiently exceeded the world interest rate. The second
horizontal intercept of IC(1) comes at higher investment level than the second intercept
of IC(2) since the borrower may still expect an overall positive return even if for some
range of investment the marginal return did not exceed the riskless world rate.
In Figure I.3., the incentive constraints of the borrower and lender are drawn. The
zero-profit condition of the lenders, P( Z ) =

R W ( I − Y1 )
, intersects the horizontal axis at
π (I )

I = Y1 . If investment equals the endowment income in equilibrium, then there is no
borrowing or lending, so there would be no repayment. Once investment is greater than
the endowment, we would see some positive amount of repayment necessary for the zeroprofit condition to hold. As debt initially grows, the amount of the repayment must
increase since the lender must get repaid some positive amount in order to break even.
Therefore, the slope of the zero-profit condition must initially be positive.
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Under

diminishing returns, it can be shown that it will always have a positive slope. In Figure
I.3., the zero-profit condition is drawn with a positive slope.
However, if there are some initial increasing returns, then the slope of the zeroprofit condition may actually be negative under some range of investment levels. If the
marginal returns increase high enough, then it is possible that the additional debt
increases the probability of the good state enough such that the repayment required to
break even will decrease. To see this, if we calculate the first derivative from the zeroprofit condition,

∂P ( Z )
, we can find that it will be positive if π ( I ) > Dπ ' ( I ) , which is
∂I

not necessarily true under increasing returns to scale. What this means is that it is
possible that an increase in loans to the borrower may actually decrease their real debt
since the borrowers can be allowed to repay less because of the decrease in uncertainty
that the investment will be successful.
In addition, given the slope of the borrower’s incentive constraint, even without a
dip in the zero profit condition, it is possible that the borrower may not be willing to
agree to repay an acceptable amount to the lenders at some low amount of debt, but at a
higher level of debt the borrowers and lenders may achieve an incentive-compatible
contract. This case is shown in Figure I.3. While a dip in the zero-profit condition is
possible if we assume the income is low enough, there is no guarantee given such
parameters that the zero-profit condition will ever allow for a repayment that is low
enough for the borrowers to accept. With a sufficiently high income, a contract may be
possible between the borrower and lenders, but the zero-profit condition may not have
any negative slope if it starts at an income level where the increasing returns are
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exhausted. In Figure I.3., the zero-profit condition is drawn given a sufficiently high
income where there is no range at which the slope is negative.
In Figure I.3., the endowment income of the borrower (where ZP equals zero) is
not sufficient to make domestic investment worthwhile (where IC equals zero) without
any loans. For a small amount a debt, the borrower would still not invest domestically,
which would create the bad domestic outcome and no repayment. For a large enough
debt, such that investment can reach the borrower’s incentive constraint, the borrower
would be willing to invest domestically if the promised repayment in the good outcome is
low enough. The lenders will agree to the contract if the expected repayment, π ( I ) P ( Z ) ,
gives them at least the riskless rate. In Figure I.3., the borrower and lender can agree on a
*

loan that leads to investment between I * and I . The largest loan possible in this
*

example is one that leads to the investment level of I , which will be the equilibrium
under no other constraints.
In the example in Figure I.3., the only feasible contracts are where the zero-profit
condition of the lenders meet the first condition of the incentive constraint of the
borrowers (see IC(1) in Figure I.2.). This says that in equilibrium, the borrowers are
investing domestically and getting marginal product that is not only higher than the world
interest rate, but if the repayment is included, the net marginal return is still higher than
the riskless interest rate. This possible result differs than what can happen if only
diminishing returns were assumed (and higher initial returns), where the borrowers would
only be concerned about the net marginal return on the additional investment and not the
expected net overall return from the investment.
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*

Where investment equals I ,

repayment that sets the net marginal return equal to the world interest rate would be at a
higher repayment than the repayment on the incentive constraint in Figure I.3., which can
*

be seen in IC(2) in Figure I.2.. If investment was at I , then the borrowers would be
willing to accept a higher repayment at the margin, but since the borrowers do not have to
invest anything domestically, they would not accept any repayment that would on
average give them a lower net return than what they could have made lending at the
*

world rate. For investment above I , the repayment that the lenders need in order to
break even exceeds the amount that the borrower would be willing to make, even though
the amount that the borrower would be willing to repay increases. Therefore, with initial
increasing returns, a sufficiently poor country may get less debt, invest less, and have a
higher domestic marginal product than compared to the case with only diminishing
returns.
A larger endowment income may shift the ZP curve to where it only intersects the
IC curve on the IC(2) portion. In this case, the borrower will accept a repayment that sets
the net marginal return equal to the world interest rate. A higher repayment may still
give the borrower an expected positive net overall return, but the borrower could benefit
more by secretly lending any funds that allow for investment to exceed the point where
the net marginal return equal the riskless rate. The lenders, therefore, would not be
willing to lend any amount above the point where the two curves intersect. This result is
similar to the case where only diminishing returns to scale is assumed. If the endowment
income is much smaller than the example in Figure I.3., then the lenders and borrowers
cannot agree on any loan amount. This differs from the diminishing returns case, where
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initial returns are high and there will always be some amount that the two parties could
agree on.
We can also see that in an equilibrium that yields a contract, the borrowers will
not secretly lend any amount at the world rate. As long as the contract is incentivecompatible for both the lenders and borrowers, there will be no capital flight. If the
borrower chose to secretly lend abroad, then it must mean that the promised repayment in
the good state was too high to invest all the loans domestically. This would mean that the
repayment and investment schedule was not on the incentive constraint of the borrower,
and hence not an equilibrium contract.
I.III. Two-Country Equilibria with Increasing Returns
In this section, I will setup the two-country model as in Gertler and Rogoff
(1990), but I will introduce initial increasing returns to scale.

We will see how

introducing increasing returns to scale can further explain the possibility of capital flows
from the poor country to the rich country. In fact, I will show how capital must flow
from the rich country to the poor country under diminishing returns as we go from
autarky to free international capital flows in this model. With increasing returns to scale,
we may observe capital flowing from the poor country to the rich country, as in capital
flight from the Southern cone.
Assume two countries, Rich and Poor, have equal populations. In each country, a
fraction s of the population are savers, and 1-s are entrepreneurs.

The savers can

diversify their portfolio and assure themselves of a riskless return of R , which I will
solve for in this section. In the Rich country, both entrepreneurs and savers have an
endowment of y1r , while in the Poor country they have an endowment of y1p . Both
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countries have identical preferences and technologies. I assume that individuals in the
Rich country have a higher endowment, y1r > y1p . As in the small country case, I define
the utility function as U (C1 , C2 ) = C2 , so all of the first-period income will be invested.
If there were no asymmetric information, then we would expect the investment
levels in the Rich and the Poor countries to be governed by the first-order conditions,

π ' ( I r ) Z = R r and π ' ( I p ) Z = R p . Under full information we would have the optimal
r

p

level of investment for both countries, I = I . The world interest rate would then be
equal the common expected marginal product of capital,

 y1r + y1p 
π ' ( I )Z = π ' ( I )Z = π ' 
Z
 2(1 − s ) 
r

p

(10)

where the investment levels are per entrepreneur. Intuitively, if the income will flow to
the country yielding the highest rate of return, and the countries’ have the same
technology with eventual diminishing returns, then we would expect half of the world
income to be invested by entrepreneurs in one country and the other half to be invested
by the entrepreneurs in the other country.
Under the full-information case with only diminishing returns, savings cannot
flow from the Poor country to the Rich country as we go from autarky to free
international capital flows.

If savings did flow from the Poor country to the Rich

country, then it must have meant that the Poor country had a lower marginal product
under autarky. However, this means that the initial endowment of the Poor country per
entrepreneur must have been greater than the efficient level of investment per
entrepreneur, or

yp
y p + yr
. This inequality simplifies to y p > y r , which is a
>
1 − s 2(1 − s )
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contradiction. In the efficient outcome under full information and diminishing returns,
savings must flow from the Rich to the Poor country.
However, the efficient outcome will be distorted when I introduce moral hazard
with state-contingent repayment plans that have different values for the different states.
We would then expect a poor country that has to borrow more to reach I would have a
more severe moral hazard problem than a rich country, given that it has to pay more in
the good outcome, and it would be given a contract that yields less investment than a rich
country. By introducing initial increasing returns, we will see that this inefficiency can
be worse. With increasing returns, the moral hazard problem could create an even bigger
investment gap between the Poor and the Rich country than if there were only
diminishing returns. When entrepreneurs of the rich country have the advantage of not
having to borrow as much (or pay back as much) as the entrepreneurs of a poor country
for a given level of investment, the rich country has a less severe moral hazard problem
since the difference in repayment in the two states of nature is not as great. The rich
country can then contract for more funds that leads to more investment, and with
increasing returns get a higher rate of return, which leads to even more funds and
investment and a greater gap in investment levels between the two countries.
As in Gertler and Rogoff (1990), I will assume both y1r < I

r

and y1p < I

p

in

equilibrium, so entrepreneurs in both countries must be financed by the savers to achieve
the first-best equilibrium. In this two-country general equilibrium model, all the income
will be invested. The question of this section is how the income will be distributed
between the two countries, and how will the introduction of initial increasing returns to
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scale can affect the investment gap between the two countries. I will now set up the twocountry model and show that introducing increasing returns can explain the possibility of
savings flowing from the poorer to the richer country.
As in the small-country case, under asymmetric information, the contracts that are
offered to the entrepreneurs must satisfy their incentive-compatibility constraints. In this
two-country setup, where the world rate is endogenous, the borrowers are concerned with
the incentive constraints

P( Z ) r = Z −

Rp
Rr
p
P
Z
Z
=
−
(
)
and
,
π ' (I r )
π ' (I p )

which is IC(2) in the small country case. The first condition of the incentive constraint in
the small country case is not applicable here since the world rate is endogenous and
cannot be taken as given when considering the total investment. As in the small country
case, the lenders face the zero-profit conditions
p

R p ( I p − y1 )
R r ( I − y1r )
p
P( Z ) =
and P( Z ) =
.
π (I p )
π (I r )
r

I can solve for R by setting the borrower’s incentive constraint and the lender’s zeroprofit condition equal to each other. For the Rich country (and a parallel solution for the
Poor) we have,

Rr =

π ' ( I r )Z
.
π ' ( I r )( I r − y1r )
1+
π (I r )

(11)

This is the same equation as in Gertler and Rogoff (1990); however, with the introduction
of increasing returns to investment, we could get different possible outcomes in regards
to the equilibrium investment level.
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Graphically, the investment levels which yield the same returns from the two
r

countries are shown in Figure I.4. The curves labeled R = R

p

are investment levels

where the risk-free interest rate for the Poor and the Rich country are equal. The IS
curve, with a slope of negative one, is where all the income is invested. Point C is the
efficient point, where I r = I p . An equilibrium where investment is occurring in both
countries will be where the interest rates were equal. If the interest rates were not equal,
then we would expect savings to flow to the country with the higher interest rate.
We see from Figure I.4. that we have two separate curves that show where the
r

p

interest rates are equalized between the countries, R = R . With initial increasing
returns and then decreasing returns, high levels of investment by the Rich country can
give a return that is the same as low levels of investment by the Poor country, and vice
versa. Given the two curves, we have three possible interior equilibria, points A, B, and
D. These points are where all the income is invested and where both countries have the
r

same interest rate. As will be clear below, the more interesting R = R

p

curve is the

upper one for investment levels I r , I p > y1p , and the more plausible equilibrium in our
setup is at point B.
When the entrepreneurs in both countries can finance their investment without
relying on the savers, we should expect the rate of return for the Rich country to be equal
to the Poor country for a given investment level. Since there is no repayment required
when I < y1 , the expected return to investment in each country would simply be π ' ( I ) Z .
Therefore, we have R r = R p at I r = I p when I r , I p ≤ y1p . Now focusing on the upper

R r = R p curve, when investment levels are above the income of the entrepreneurs of the
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Poor country, the Rich country will have a higher net expected rate of return for each
given investment level. The Poor country has a lower net expected rate of return because
of the repayment they must make in the good state of nature, and the corresponding
interest rate will be lower in autarky in the Poor country. The equilibrium interest rate
sets the repayment equal between the borrower and lender as in equation 11. Looking at
the R r = R p curves in Figure I.3., we would expect to see a jump from the lower curve to
the higher curve as investment levels surpass y1p . When investment levels initially
surpass y1p , the entrepreneurs of the Poor country must borrow money to invest, and this
will result in a relatively lower net expected rate of return since they now must repay the
lenders. So for the investment levels, y1p ≤ I < y1r , we are comparing an expected rate of

π ' ( I p )Z
return of π ' ( I ) Z for the entrepreneurs in the Rich country and
π ' ( I p )( I p − y1p )
1+
π (I p )
p

for the entrepreneurs of the Poor country.
As investment surpasses y1H for the Rich country, the entrepreneurs have to start
borrowing and the expected riskless rate of return for the Rich country is
Rr =

π ' ( I r )Z
. In order for the expected rate of return for the Rich country to
π ' ( I r )( I r − y1r )
1+
π (I r )

equal the expected rate of return for the Poor country at I p = y1p , the returns should fall
in the Rich country. If the returns are increasing at I p = y1p , then there could be a large
investment gap between the two countries by the time the rate of return of the Rich
country returns to the level it was at when I r = I p = y1p . This is the gap between the two
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R r = R p curves at I p = y1p . On the other hand, if there were diminishing returns from
the start, then there would be no discontinuity, simply a gradual continuous increase in
the difference of the investment levels along a single R r = R p curve in the range
y1p ≤ I < y1r .
Under increasing returns, as we look at investment levels for the Poor country
above y1p , we would expect to see the investment gap between the two countries to
decrease, which is represented by a dip in the upper R r = R p curve. We should see the
investment gap decrease because the rate of return for the Poor country is increasing and
the rate of return for the Rich country is decreasing at the higher investment level, so a
decline in I r would increase R r to match the increase in R p in the Poor country.
In Figure I.4., the IS line represents the point where investment equals savings,
y1r + y1p
= I r + I p . Since all income will be invested according to our utility function
1− s

(1), the equilibrium should end up on that line. Because of the moral hazard problem, we
would not end up at the efficient point C, where the investments levels equal to each
other (note:

∂R
>0 for a given level of investment, so for the same investment level the
∂y1

richer country would have a higher marginal return at the efficient point). Point B seems
to be the equilibrium with the most intuitive appeal.

As pointed out earlier, until I > y1p

, the relevant curve is the lower R r = R p . Then we jump to the upper curve until all the
savings are invested. This would leave us at point B. At this point, we see there is more
investment in the richer country, and possibly savings are flowing from the poor country
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to the rich country. Points A and D are also possible equilibria since the returns are equal
at those points, and all income is invested, but the mechanism at which we get to those
levels is not as intuitive.
Increasing returns to investment may create a greater investment gap between
countries compared to decreasing returns because of the jump from the lower to the upper

R r = R p curve at I = y1F . In fact, it is possible that no savers will acquire securities
from the poor country if the jump on the upper R r = R p curve reaches the IS curve. This
would happen if all of the income was invested before the rate of return of the Rich
country returned to the rate of return of the Poor country when I r = I p = y1p . This
would depend on the specified probability function π (I ) and its marginal return π ' ( I ) .
While diminishing returns results in an investment gap because of moral hazard,
introducing initial increasing returns could create a larger gap and help further explain
why we see a difference in investment levels between rich and poor countries.
Not only can increasing returns create a bigger gap in investment levels between
the rich and poor countries, it can also lead to capital flows from the poor to the rich
countries. With diminishing returns, we cannot have capital flows from the poor to the
rich countries as we move from autarky to free international capital flows, and this is
shown in the appendix.
Equilibrium Interest rates
We are now in position to show that introducing increasing returns can lead to
equilibrium interest rates that lie outside the autarky levels for the Poor and Rich country.
We would normally expect the equilibrium interest rate to lie within the interval between
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the autarky interest rates. To show that with increasing returns the equilibrium interest
rate(s) can fall outside the interval between the autarky interest rates, it suffices simply to
provide an example. I do this in section IV.
Under diminishing returns, the equilibrium interest rate with free international
capital flows must lie in the interval between the two autarky interest rates. From
equation 11, we can find

∂R
< 0 . If one country has a higher R, savings will flow to that
∂I

country, and it will lower R. I just showed in the previous section that under diminishing
returns, the richer country will have a lower R. Therefore, under diminishing returns, as
we go from autarky to free international capital flows, savings would flow from the rich
to the poor country. The poorer country’s interest rate would then decrease and the richer
country’s interest rate would increase until the rates were equal. Hence, it must be that in
equilibrium the interest rate will lie between the autarky levels.
To see a clearer picture of the effects of introducing initial increasing returns to
investment, we can look at a numerical example.

In section IV, I will examine a

simulation by specifying a probability function that satisfies all the assumptions and
requirements stated in the beginning of this paper. I will then go through an example of
the two-country model. I will then show how the equilibrium interest rates with free
capital mobility and increasing returns can lie outside the autarky rates.
I.IV. A Simulation
The Two-Country Case
As a first step, I will specify a probability function π (I ) that has initial increasing
returns and then decreasing returns, while always assuming π ' ( I ) > 0 . We should also at
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the same time give a value to the good state, Z, so we can get the rate of return for the
entrepreneur. For simplicity, set Z = 2 . For ease of exposition, the relevant investment
levels would then be in the range 0 ≤ I ≤ 2 , since the value Z is known, and no
investment should exceed Z (otherwise an entrepreneur would be willingly investing an
amount with no possibility of a return higher than his investment). An example of a
probability function that satisfies all the properties for the investment values 0 ≤ I ≤ 2 is

π (I ) =

1

1 I
I .
2

To illustrate my results in the two-country general equilibrium, I can graph the
rates of return for each country and see if it implies a graph similar to Figure I.4. To
better understand where the graph in Figure I.4. comes from, I can decompose it by
drawing three curves, π ' ( I ) Z ,

π ' ( I r )Z
π ' ( I r )( I r − y1r )
1+
π (I r )

, and

π ' ( I p )Z
. As stated
π ' ( I p )( I p − y1p )
1+
π (I p )

earlier, when I ≤ y1 , then the entrepreneurs are not borrowing any funds from the savers
in order to finance their investment, so there is no repayment and the net return on
investment is π ' ( I ) Z . Once I ≥ y1 , the entrepreneurs have to borrow from the savers,
which means the contracts must satisfy both the incentive constraints of the borrower and
the zero-profit conditions of the lender. Therefore, we have R =

π ' ( I )Z
in
π ' ( I )( I − y1 )
1+
π (I )

equilibrium for a country whose entrepreneurs must rely on the savers.
In Figure I.5., I graph the interest rates for each country, assuming the
entrepreneurs in the Rich country have an income of y1 = 0.6 , while the entrepreneurs in
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the Poor country have an income of y1 = 0.3 . The interest rates of the two countries are
the same for each investment level below 0.3, which is the income endowment of the
Poor entrepreneurs. As investment surpasses 0.3, we see that the Rich country has a
higher rate of return than the Poor country. Savings would then flow towards the Rich
country until the rate of return of the Rich country returns to the level of the Poor
country.
In this example, the rate of return of the Rich country does not return to the same
level as the Poor country at I = 0.3 until investment in the Rich country reaches 1.28 per
entrepreneur. This explains the jump that I explained in Figure I.4. from the lower to the
upper

R r = R p curve. As investment in the Poor country initially increases from 0.3,

we see that the interest rate goes up, and an equivalent interest rate for the Rich country
would be accompanied by an investment level of a little less than 1.28. This is why we
see a small dip in Rich investment in Figure I.4. after the jump to the upper

Rr = R p

curve. Also, as the Poor increases investment from 0.3, the higher interest rate of the
Poor country can be achieved by lower investment levels of the Rich country, which
r

explains the lower R = R

p

curve in Figure I.4. Eventually, the investment gap for a

given interest rate starts to converge because of decreasing returns to investment. In
equilibrium we are looking at where all the income is invested, and where the risk-free
interest rates are equal (if an interior solution). The IS curve in Figure I.4. depends on the
amount of savers and entrepreneurs.
By introducing increasing returns to scale, we see by the jump in Figure I.4., or by
the large gap in Figure I.5., that it could potentially produce an even larger difference in
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investment than if we only assumed decreasing returns to scale. We see in Figure I.5.
that introducing increasing returns to scale creates an initial larger advantage for the Rich
country than if we just assumed decreasing returns to scale. And as I explained earlier,
savings can flow from the Poor to the Rich country.
Equilibrium Interest Rates with Increasing Returns
I can show by example that the equilibrium interest rate with free international
capital flows can lie outside the interval between the autarky interest rates. Using the
same setting as before, I will assume that the individuals in the Rich country have an
income of 0.6, while the individuals in the Poor country have an income of 0.3. I will
also set the proportion of savers to be 0.42. We can now calculate autarky investment per
entrepreneur,

y1
, for the Rich country, I Ar = 1.034 , and the Poor country, I Ap = .517 .
1− s

We can now solve for the autarky risk-free interest rate by plugging the autarky
investment levels into the equation R A =

π ' ( I )Z
. For the rich country we get
π ' ( I )( I − y1 )
1+
π (I )

R Ar = 0.948 and for the poor country we get R Ap = 1.104 . I explained earlier that for a
given investment level, the rich country will have a higher interest rate, but here we have
two different investment levels. Given that the rate of return on investment is initially
increasing then decreasing, we could set the income levels and population parameters so
that either the Rich or the Poor country has a higher risk-free interest rate in autarky.
Now we can find the equilibrium interest rates under free international capital
flows.

In equilibrium, we must have R r = R p .

Since we know the total world

investment per entrepreneur is now I Ar + I Ap = I W = 1.552 , we can find the equilibrium
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interest rates by setting

π ' ( I r )Z

=

π ' ( I W − I r )Z

π ' ( I W − I r )( I W − I r − y1r )
π ' ( I r )( I r − y1r )
1
+
1+
π (I W − I r )
π (I r )

. Solving, I

find that there are three possible equilibria, which is shown in Table I.1. In each of these
possible equilibria, the riskless interest rate lies either above or below the interval
between the autarky rates 0.948 and 1.104.

Note that the efficient point, where

I r = I p = .776 , such as point C on Figure I.3., is not an equilibrium because at that point

R r = 1.554 and R p = 1.067 , which means savings would have an incentive to flow to the
Rich country.
In the first equilibrium, we see that it corresponds to a point like B on Figure I.3.
This seems to be the most intuitive equilibrium starting from an autarkic equilibrium. In
this case, in autarky the interest rate for the Poor country is higher. Therefore, we would
expect savings to flow to the Poor country from the Rich country with free capital
mobility. Since the Poor country is experiencing increasing returns to scale in autarky,
while the Rich country is experiencing decreasing returns, the flow of funds from the
Rich to the Poor will increase the interest rate in both countries. In equilibrium, the
interest rate can end up higher than the interest rates in autarky. The Poor country still
does not obtain the efficient level of investment because of the moral hazard introduced
in the model. The second and third possible equilibria correspond to points like A and D
on Figure I.4. They are equilibria in a sense that all the income is invested and the
interest rates are equal across countries. The transition from the autarky equilibrium to
those points, however, is not as intuitive.
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I.V. Conclusions
The paper combined increasing returns to investment and moral hazard into an
international lending and borrowing model.

The paper gives us an alternative

explanation regarding the phenomenon of inefficient investment in poorer countries. I
expanded on the model introduced by Gertler and Rogoff (1990), where they showed
how asymmetric information can lead to less investment in the poorer country. By
introducing initial increasing returns, however, we see that we can have equilibrium
investment levels much lower in the small-country model than with diminishing returns.
In the two-country model, I demonstrated that increasing returns helps explain how we
can get savings flows from the Poor to the Rich country, and the possibility of multiple
equilibria. I also demonstrated that equilibrium interest rates can lie outside of autarkic
levels after the capital account is liberalized.
The literature gives several reasons why we do not see capital flowing from the
richer countries to the poorer countries. These include technology levels, human capital
levels (Lucas 1990), institutions (Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych 2005), and
serial default (Reinhart and Rogoff 2004). In this paper, as in Gertler and Rogoff (1990),
I assumed the same technology and enforceable contracts in the two-country model. The
only difference between the countries in our two-country model was their income.
The implications of the results in the small country case is that a country may
need at least some minimum amount of funds to take advantage of the increasing returns,
but still too much funds can lead to a moral hazard problem. Initial increasing returns
with free capital flows would not be a problem in this model if it were not for the
asymmetric information. To prevent default (or capital flight in this model), a lender may
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need to both lend more to take advantage of increasing returns and setup a better
mechanism to monitor the investment. Previous models ignore the minimum lending
requirement.
Further research can focus on different sectors of the economy to determine the
impact of increasing returns on sovereign debt. Some sectors may have large economies
of scale while other sectors may not. With asymmetric information, poorer countries
may struggle to get loans for sectors that have large economies of scale, and they may
have to settle for investment in less productive sectors. A sovereign debt model may be
extended to analyze this situation.
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Figure I.1. Marginal Returns to Investment

π ' ( I )Z
RW

π ' ( I )Z

I

~
I

I

I

Notes: Figure I.1. shows the marginal return to investment in the domestic economy,
π ' ( I ) Z , and the world interest rate. At low levels of investment, the marginal return in
the domestic economy is low, but it increases and surpasses the world interest rate at
higher levels of investment.
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Figure I.2. Incentive Constraint of the Borrower

P(Z )

IC (2)
IC (1)

IC

I

Notes: Figure I.2 shows the incentive constraint of the borrower (IC), given that it must
make a net marginal return equal to the riskless interest rate, IC(2), and it must at least
get an overall return from domestic investment that is as high as the return from using all
the funds to buy riskless securities, IC(1). For any required repayment, P(Z), which
exceeds the points on the incentive constraint, the borrower will have an incentive to use
all of its funds to buy riskless securities, and default on the loan.
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Figure I.3. Incentive-Compatible Contracts

P(Z )

ZP

IC

Y1

I

*

I

*

I

Notes: Figure I.3. displays the possible contracts given that the lenders make zero profit
(ZP), and the borrower will get an expected net return of at least the world interest rate.
In this example, the borrower and lenders can agree on a repayment, P(Z), for investment
*

*

levels between I and I .
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Figure I.4. Two-Country Equilibria

Ir
y1r + y1p
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y1r + y1p
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Notes: In Figure I.4., three possible equilibria are shown. Two curves represent where the
interest rates are equalized across nations ( R r = R p ), and the IS curve is where all
savings is invested. Equilibrium will exist where all the funds are invested and the
interest rates are equalized, such as at points A, B, and D. Point C is the efficient point,
but at the efficient point the rich country has a higher interest rate than the poor country
because of the moral hazard problem.
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Figure I.5. Autarkic Interest Rates
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Notes: Figure I.5. shows the autarkic interest rates for the poor and the rich country at
each given investment level.
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Table I.1. Possible Equilibria*
Investment
Rich

Poor

World Interest Rate

0.942

0.609

1.125

1.164

0.389

0.746

0.294

1.258

0.564

* Rich income= 0.6, Poor income= 0.3

Notes: Table I.1 shows three possible equilibria for a given income level of two
countries. These are where all the funds are invested and the interest rates are equalized
across countries.

37

II. INCREASING RETURNS, COLLATERAL, AND SOVEREIGN DEBT
II.I. Introduction
International capital flows have not flowed to capital-scarce countries as much as
we would expect under diminishing returns to capital. In fact, capital has flowed mostly
to the rich, capital-abundant countries. Explanations for this phenomenon, or the “Lucas
Paradox” (1990), include fundamental differences, such as differences in institutions,
education, or other missing factors of production. Explanations also include international
capital market imperfections, such as asymmetric information and sovereign risk. In this
paper, I will assume that there is a combination of sovereign risk, increasing returns to
scale, and collateral differences across sectors that help explain why most capital has not
flowed to the poor countries.
Another phenomenon that has received a lot of attention is the negative
relationship between natural resource abundance and economic growth. Many empirical
studies have shown that the more natural resource abundant, the lower the growth rate of
per capita gross domestic product (for instance, see Sachs and Warner (1995) and
Gylfason (2001)). Theoretically, the literature has given many reasons why natural
resource abundance can be a curse (for a couple of the preliminary works, see Krugman
(1987) and Matsuyama (1992)). In this paper, natural resources are not a curse, but
instead the poor countries invest heavily in that sector because of the inability to access
enough funds to invest in sectors that exhibit increasing returns to scale.
In a related phenomenon, studies have pointed out the existence of a bimodal or
twin-peak world income distribution (for instance, see Quah (1996) and Jones (1997)).
Since 1960, there seems to be a movement towards a cluster of countries at a low income
and cluster of countries at a high income level. In this paper, I will show that poor
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countries can get stuck producing in less efficient sectors because of sovereign risk and
collateral differences across sectors, while countries with sufficiently high income levels
can take advantage of economies of scale.
My paper simultaneously explains the above three phenomena.

I examine

sovereign borrowing in a two-sector economy. The sovereign can invest in sectors such
as natural resources (oil, minerals, timber, etc.), agriculture, and low-skilled
manufacturing (textiles, toys, etc.), or the borrower can invest in sectors such as highskilled manufacturing (engineering, information technology, etc.) and other sectors that
require investments in infrastructure (roads, bridges, utilities, etc.), education, and health.
The first type of sectors require less initial investment and get higher returns at low levels
of investment than the second type of sectors. The second type of sectors may yield
higher returns than the first type of sectors, but only after a sufficient amount of capital is
invested. The first type of sectors are characterized by diminishing returns to scale
(DRS), while the second type of sectors are characterized by increasing returns to scale
(IRS) at low levels of investment.
I find that countries below a threshold income level may only get enough loans to
invest in the DRS sector, but countries above the threshold will invest mostly in the IRS
sector. If the borrower could commit to repay the loans, then it could invest in the IRS
sector and be better off, but it cannot commit to repay under high levels of debt because
of the lack of punishment from default. It is also possible that even if the borrower had
an incentive to repay the loan if the funds were invested as specified in a contract, the
borrower may invest differently and default on the loan. Under collateral differences
across sectors, the lender may only lend enough so that the sovereign will have an
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incentive to only invest in the less-productive sector.

However, countries with

sufficiently high income can receive enough loans to invest mostly in the IRS sector until
they become indifferent between repaying and defaulting.
What can be done to help the poor countries? The results from this paper suggest
familiar policy implications, which however are contingent on the income of the
borrower. For example, if countries are stuck producing in sectors with low productivity,
there can be several things that can be done to push them over the threshold to produce in
the sectors with high productivity. One obvious remedy would be foreign aid. However,
in this model, some foreign aid may have little effect on a poor country because the
lenders may reduce the loan amount in fear of the sovereign investing in the IRS sector
and defaulting. A sufficiently large amount of aid may give disproportionally more help
to the poor country by inviting more loans to take advantage of increasing returns to
scale. A country whose income level is sufficiently high will benefit from aid more than a
very poor country because they can credibly commit to repay when investing in sectors
that have increasing returns to scale. Another possible remedy, as pointed out in other
sovereign debt models, is an increase in collateralization or punishment for default.
However, in this model an increase in punishment can also substantially change the
composition of investment in the sovereign nation. If a country has an incentive to only
invest in the DRS sector, and the DRS sector becomes more collateralized, it may
actually lead to an equilibrium with most investment in the IRS sector. In other models,
monitoring investment may also benefit the borrower. However, in this model, the
poorest borrowers will not benefit from monitoring. Countries with a sufficiently high
income may benefit from monitoring, but the monitoring may only provide limited help.
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Though empirical evidence supports increasing returns to scale, theoretical
literature incorporating such returns remains sparse. Investment in infrastructure and
manufacturing has been shown to have increasing returns to scale. For instance, while
testing for the existence of poverty traps, Rodriquez (2008) finds evidence of increasing
returns to manufacturing across nations. Duggal, Saltzman, and Klein (1999, 2007) do an
empirical study on infrastructure and IT in the U.S., and tests an s-shaped production
function (similar to my assumption), and they find support for increasing returns at low
levels of inputs. Fingleton and McCombie (1998) find evidence of increasing returns in
EU manufacturing. Oliveira, Jayme, Jr., and Lemos (2006) find evidence of increasing
returns in manufacturing in Brazil, and Park and Kwon (1995) find support for economies
of scale in Korean manufacturing. Two exceptions that do discuss increasing returns and
sovereign debt are Karayalcin, McCollister, and Mitra (2002) and Spiegel (1995).
Karayalcin et al. (2002) show how including increasing returns in infrastructure can
create a situation where a minimum amount of debt is necessary in order for repayment to
be made.

Spiegel shows that increasing returns could enhance long-term lending

strategies.
In section II., I set up the model and solve the maximization problem of the
borrower, given an income and debt level. The equilibrium debt level will be solved for
in section III., including the case with collateral differences across sectors. In section
IV., the relationship between income and debt will be examined, along with its
implications regarding foreign aid and income distribution.

Perfect monitoring of

investment will be examined in section V., and the discussion will conclude in section
VI. The functions and parameters used in the illustrations can be found in the appendix.
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II.II. The Model
I build a two-period, two-sector, small open-economy model of sovereign debt.
The focus will be on the optimal actions of a social planner or government, and thereby I
ignore any externality issues involved with increasing returns to scale (which could result
in a bad equilibrium). In the first period, the borrowing country receives an endowment
income, Y1 . Output in the second period, Y2 , depends on investment. A borrowing
country can invest in two sectors of the economy, one with diminishing returns, and one
with increasing returns to capital. The lenders can observe the output of the borrowing
country, but they cannot control in which sector the borrowing country invests (this
assumption will be relaxed later). The borrowing country is sovereign, so they can
default on their loan. As in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), I assume that if a country
defaults, the lenders can extract some portion of the borrower’s output.
Although this model uses direct punishment in case of default, it may be difficult
to validate it with many recent examples. Nonetheless, models based on reputation and
fear of losing access to capital markets must also make assumptions that are difficult to
justify. 3 The reality is that there may be many reasons why a borrower does or does not
default. A borrower may be in fear of sanctions or interference with trade, political
repercussions, losing future access to credit markets, or the borrower may just be morally
obliged to repay. While this paper uses direct punishments, the result is that the rich
country can be punished more in absolute terms than a poor country in case of default.

3

Models based on reputation must typically assume that the borrower must continuously need more funds
in the future, and the borrowers are infinitely lived.
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This logic seems reasonable since a rich country typically has more collateral through
more international entanglements than a poor country.
Depending on the type of investments, a country may be more or less susceptible
to punishment in case of default.

If a poor country invests the loan in natural resources

and low-skilled manufacturing, sectors which poor countries tends to export, then
defaulting on the loan can lead to costly sanctions or possibly a seizure of assets. If a
poor country instead invests in a sector such as infrastructure or education, then
defaulting on the loan may not result in much punishment. To compare and contrast with
previous models, I will examine the problem under both identical and different
punishments across sectors.
Although the borrower may have many considerations when deciding to repay a
loan or default, including political or religious reasons, the focus in this paper will only
be on financial incentives. Thus, the borrowing country chooses to repay only if default
is too costly: Repayment = min [(1 + r ) D2 , n[ F N ( K 2N ) + K 2N )] + z[ F M ( K 2M ) + K 2M )]] ,

(1)

where K 2N is the capital devoted to the diminishing-returns sector, and K 2M is the capital
devoted to the increasing-returns sector. Capital does not depreciate. F N ( K 2N ) is the
output from the diminishing-returns sector (DRS), and F M ( K 2M ) is the output from the
increasing-returns sector (IRS).
default is the fraction

n

D2 is the amount borrowed. The punishment for

of the DRS good and

z

of the IRS good.

Production in the IRS sector yields low returns for low levels of investment, but it
exhibits increasing returns until the increasing returns are eventually exhausted and
become diminishing returns after some investment level. Production in the DRS sector
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yields high returns for initial investment levels, but exhibits diminishing returns
throughout. Graphically, the type of production functions which will be discussed are of
the kind represented in Figure II.1. Although, in some instances, investment in IRS
sectors may increase production in the DRS sectors, such as through infrastructure, I
assume for convenience that it does not. Similarly, I assume that there is sufficient
existing infrastructure (roads and bridges) to extract natural resources, and adding such
infrastructure will mainly benefit other businesses.
In previous models of sovereign debt, borrowers may have an incentive to default
by consuming more in the first period and investing less in the second period. For
example, without uncertainty, a loan that exceeds a debt threshold could lead to a
discontinuous crash in investment in order to reduce anticipated creditor sanctions
(Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996). That result would be the same in a two-sector model,
making it even more difficult for a poor country to get enough loans to take advantage of
increasing returns. In the two-sector set up, the borrower may not invest in the sectors as
the lender may want, and this could also lead to default. To focus only on the investment
composition decision and abstract from the effects of consumption smoothing or default
stemming from first-period consumption, I assume that the representative agent of the
small country gets utility only from second-period consumption:
U (C N , C M ) = C2N + C2M .

(2)

For ease of exposition, set prices equal to one for both goods, and those prices are taken
and do not change. Since prices are taken by the sovereign, the borrower only cares
about maximizing its output, which would then maximize its consumption and utility.
Investment in each sector is
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I1M = Y1 + D2 − I1N = K 2M

(3a)

and
I 1N = Y1 + D2 − I 1M = K 2N .

(3b)

Consumption in the second period is
C 2 = F N ( K 2N ) + F M ( K 2M ) + K 2N + K 2M − ℜ ,

(4)

where ℜ is the repayment. Since the borrowing country cannot commit to repay, its
repayment must never exceed the cost of sanctions. The lenders must make (1 + r ) D2 in
order to be willing to lend. Therefore, the sanctions under default must be at least as
large as the risk-free return on the debt,
n[ F N ( K 2N ) + K 2N ] + z[ F M ( K 2M ) + K 2M ] ≥ (1 + r ) D2 .

(5)

The borrowing country is therefore trying to solve:
max F N ( K 2N ) + K 2N + F M ( K 2M ) + K 2M -

(6)

K 2N , K 2M

N

N
2

N
2

min [(1 + r ) D2 , n[ F ( K ) + K ] + z[ F

M

(K

M
2

)+K

M
2

]],

given D2 = K 2N + K 2N − Y1 . Under default, the maximization problem is
max F N ( K 2N ) + K 2N + F M ( K 2M ) + K 2M -

K 2N , K 2M

n[ F N ( K 2N ) + K 2N ] − z[ F M ( K 2M ) + K 2M ].

Solving, if an interior maximum exists, the maximum is where the net marginal rates of
return are equalized:
( f ' N +1)(1 − n) = ( f ' M +1)(1 − z ) .
Under repayment, the maximization problem is
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max F M ( K 2M ) + F N ( K 2N ) + K 2N + K 2M − (1 + r ) D2

K 2M , K 2N

F M ( K 2M ) + F N ( K 2N ) + K 2N + K 2M − (1 + r )( K 2N + K 2M − Y1 ) .
= max
M
N
K2 ,K2

Solving, if an interior maximum exists, then the maximum is achieved where the
marginal rates of return are equalized, f ' N = f ' M . Given an income and debt level, there
can be at least two points that set the marginal rates equal (one may be a minimum). As
will be discussed, if the initial income of the borrower is too low, the maximum utility
will be achieved when all the funds are invested in the decreasing-returns sector. A key
assumption that is made here is that the sovereign borrower does not have enough funds
to invest efficiently in both sectors, where f ' N = f ' M = r , nor will the sovereign nation
be able to borrow enough to make the efficient investments because of the incentive to
default.
In order to get explicit solutions, I would have to specify explicit production
functions and parameters, which is done in the background to help illustrate the results
(see appendix), but they are not specified here since the parameters and numbers are
arbitrary. However, I can implicitly describe the possible equilibrium under reasonable
assumptions. We know that the lenders will not lend any amount which will lead to
default, but they will lend as much as possible up to that amount if the lenders are
competitive. The amount of the loan depends on how much the lenders expect the
borrower to invest in each sector. To compare these results to previous models, let us
first assume n = z , and then we can look at the implications of different punishments for
different sectors.

Under equal punishments across sectors, if there is an interior

equilibrium, investments will be made until marginal returns are equalized between the
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two sectors, f ' N ( K 2N ) = f 'M ( K 2M ) ≥ r.

In this case, regardless of whether the borrower

has an incentive to default or repay, if an interior maximum exists, it is achieved when
the marginal products are equalized. If the borrower is defaulting, then capital will flow
to the sector with the highest net marginal return, ( f ' N +1)(1 − n) or ( f ' M +1)(1 − z ) , but if

n = z , this reduces to f ' N ( K 2N ) or f 'M ( K 2M ) , which is also the optimal allocation under
repayment. Thus, if the borrower is being punished by the same fraction of output,
whether output came from the DRS or IRS sector, if there is an interior maximum, it is
achieved when the marginal products are equalized across sectors. Therefore, given an
income and debt level, the optimal investment-composition decision of the borrower does
not depend on whether it is repaying or defaulting if the collateral is the same across
sectors.
Figure II.2. illustrates the investment-composition decision of the borrower given
its income and loan amount, while under equal punishment fractions across sectors.
Given the utility function, the borrower will invest everything, so the only question is
how much will be invested in each sector, and whether the borrower will repay or default.
Figure II.2. shows the possible equilibria if the borrower is given a credit constraint,
Y1 + D2 = I .

Given an income and loan, the line I , with a slope of negative one,

represents all the different combinations of investment that the borrower can make in the
two sectors. For instance, if all the income and loans were invested in the diminishingreturns sector (increasing-returns sector), the borrower would be at the vertical
(horizontal) intercept on the I line in Figure II.2.
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Points B and G in Figure II.2. represent the two possible interior equilibrium
investment levels given an income and debt level. These points are the possible interior
equilibria because all funds are invested and the marginal returns in each sector are
equalized (although point B could be a minimum). The curved line represents where the
marginal returns are equalized, f ' N ( K 2N ) = f 'M ( K 2M ) , and it is U-shaped because of the
shape of the production functions. For instance, a large investment in the diminishingreturns sector will yield a similar marginal product as a small investment in the
increasing-returns sector, such as the case at point B. As investment in the IRS sector
increases, the marginal return increases in the IRS sector, and an equivalent marginal
return in the DRS sector would be achieved with less investment. Once investment in the
IRS sector is large enough such that the increasing returns are exhausted, then more
investment in the IRS sector will achieve lower marginal returns, such as the marginal
returns achieved with more investment in the DRS sector, and this explains the U-shaped
curve.
The dotted line in Figure II.2. represents the minimum amount of income and debt
needed to make investment in the IRS sector possible. If I was inside the dotted line,
then all the investment would be in the DRS sector since the marginal return of the IRS
sector never reaches the marginal return from the DRS sector. For sufficiently low
income levels, and consequently fewer loans, even if everything was invested in the IRS
sector, the marginal return in the IRS sector may still be lower than what the marginal
return would be if everything was invested in the DRS sector. Therefore, the borrower
would never have an incentive to invest anything in the IRS sector if the credit constraint
was inside the dotted line in Figure II.2.
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However, even if the credit constraint was to the right of the dotted line, the
borrower may still not have an incentive to invest any in the DRS sector. Even if a
higher marginal return can be achieved by investing all the funds the IRS sector as
opposed to investing all in the DRS sector, the borrower may still get more output by
investing only in the DRS sector. To get high marginal returns in the IRS sector, the
borrower has to accept low marginal returns at low levels of investment, which may not
be worth it unless the investment is large enough. Therefore, all capital will flow into the
DRS sector if the income is too low and the loan is insufficient for the borrower to invest
in both sectors. The amount of income necessary for investment in the DRS sector will
be illustrated in the next section when the equilibrium debt level is solved for.
When punishment for default is the same fraction of output no matter which
sector the output comes from, then the lender knows that the borrower will invest in a
way that maximizes gross output. The question for the lenders is how large can the loan
be until the borrowers have an incentive to default.

If the borrower was punished

differently according to the sector from which the output comes from, n ≠ z , then Figure
II.2. would also have to include a curve which represents where the net marginal returns
are equalized, ( f ' N +1)(1 − n) or ( f ' M +1)(1 − z ) . The borrower would then have to compare
the value of its optimal decision under default, with an interior maximum achieved where
the net marginal returns are equalized, with its optimal decision under repayment, where
an interior maximum is achieved where the marginal returns are equalized. The lenders
would have to solve the borrower’s problem in order to know how much they can lend.
This analysis is done in the next section.
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II.III. The Equilibrium Debt Contract
The previous section solves the investment composition decision of the borrower
given an income and debt level, but the decision of the borrower may affect the amount
of the loan that the lenders would be willing to give in the first place. The difficulty is
solving for the amount of the loan that the lenders would lend, given that the borrower
can use the loan to invest in whatever sector it wants and may default depending on the
composition of the investment. However, if we assume that the punishment for default
is the same across sectors, n = z , then the lenders do not need to worry about the
borrower’s composition of investment, they only need to worry about loaning too much.
This means that if the lenders give a loan that the borrower would repay if it invested
according to the contract, the borrower would not have an incentive to invest differently
and default. If we assume that punishment differs across sectors, n ≠ z , then the lenders
may have to decrease the loan because the borrower may not invest in a way that would
create an incentive for repayment, even if the borrower would have an incentive to repay
if it invested according to the contract. In either case, in order for the lenders to know
how much they can loan to the borrower and still get repaid, they must know the highest
amount of debt that would make the borrower indifferent between repaying and
defaulting.
First, we know that if the borrower has a sufficiently low income, then at low
levels of debt, the borrower will not have an incentive to invest anything in the IRS sector
if we assume the IRS sector yields low marginal returns at low levels of investment and
the DRS sector yields high marginal returns at low levels of investment. However, with
enough income and debt, the borrower may be able to invest enough to take advantage of
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the increasing returns, with the optimal amount of investment being where the net
marginal products of capital are equalized across sectors.

Therefore, the value of

defaulting can be written as
V d = max[(1 − n)[ F N (Y1 + D2 ) + Y1 + D2 ], (1 − n)[ F N (α (Y1 + D2 )) + α (Y1 + D2 )]
+ (1 − z )[ F M ((1 − α )(Y1 + D2 )) + (1 − α )(Y1 + D2 )]],

where,

D2 = K 2N + K 2M − Y1 , α =

Kˆ 2N

Kˆ 2M + Kˆ 2N

, and Kˆ 2N , Kˆ 2M

(7)

solves the first-order

condition (1 − n)( f ' N +1) = (1 − z )( f ' M +1) that corresponds to an interior maximum (not a
minimum). The equation states that under default the borrower may get the most value
from investing everything in the DRS sector and keeping the fraction 1 − n of their output
and investment; or the borrower may get the most value from keeping a fraction of their
output and investment from both sectors, while investing in each sector so that the net
marginal returns are equalized. As discussed above, at low levels of income and debt the
borrower will get the most value from investing everything in the DRS sector, while at
high levels of income and debt the borrower will get the most value by investing mostly
in the IRS sector.
Analogously, the value of repayment can be written as

V R = max[ F N (Y1 + D2 ) + Y1 + D2 − (1 + r ) D2 ,
F N (γ (Y1 + D2 )) + F M ((1 − γ )(Y1 + D2 )) + (Y1 + D2 ) − (1 + r ) D2 ],

(8)

~
K 2N
~ ~
where γ = ~ M ~ N , and K 2N , K 2M solves the first-order condition f ' N = f ' M that
K2 + K2
corresponds to an interior maximum. Under repayment, the borrower may get the most
net output from investing everything in the diminishing-returns sector; or the borrower
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may get the most net output from investing in both sectors in such a way that sets the
marginal returns equal across sectors. The equilibrium debt is the amount that sets the
utility from defaulting equal to the utility from repayment, V R = V d . Any debt that
exceeds that amount will result in default, while the lenders have no reason to restrict
debt below such an amount.
First, we can illustrate the outcomes under the assumption of equal default
punishment fractions across sectors, n = z . A sufficiently low income will lead to a loan
that will not be large enough in order for the borrowers to have an incentive to invest in
the increasing-returns sector. This case is illustrated in Figures II.3a. and II.3b. In Figure
II.3a., the value of repayment and the value of default are shown at each debt level, given
an initial income level Y1 . Each of the curves has a kink, which represents the debt level
at which investment goes from only the diminishing-returns sector to a combination of
the DRS and IRS sector.

As explained before, at low investment levels, where

investment equals Y1 + D2 , the borrower has an incentive to only invest in the DRS
sector. At some higher investment level, the borrower will have an incentive to invest in
both sectors at the point where the marginal returns are equalized. After the kink, the
value of default and the value of repayment increases at a higher rate than before because
of increasing returns. In this example, however, the borrower is too poor to receive
enough loans to have an incentive to invest in the IRS sector. The value of default and
the value of repayment are equalized at the debt level, D2* , which is not enough for the
borrower to invest in the IRS sector.
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As debt increases, both the value of repayment and the value of default increase;
and under plausible parameters, the value of default will increase more than the value of
repayment. To show this, I need to show that ∂V d / ∂D2 > ∂V R / ∂D2 . For example, if all
investment is in the DRS sector, the inequality is true if 1 + r > n(1 + f 'N ( K 2N )) , where
f 'N ( K 2N ) is the marginal return in the DRS sector. This condition is true with any

reasonable parameter. In the case where investment is in both sectors, the assumption
that default becomes more attractive as debt increases is also true under plausible
parameters, although the necessary inequality does not simplify as neatly. Note that this
implies that there is not a range of default, where higher debt makes repayment more
attractive. Throughout this paper, it will be assumed that the value of default increases
more than the value of repayment as debt increases, which will be the same as assuming
that we will not have a combination of both extremely severe punishment for default and
extremely high marginal returns.
Figure II.3b. illustrates the relationship between debt and the composition of
investment. For low levels investment, all the funds, Y1 + D2 , will go to the diminishingreturns sector, since the increasing-returns sector only yields sufficient returns at high
levels of investment. In this example, the equilibrium debt level is not enough to entice
the borrower to invest any funds in the IRS sector. As we can see in Figure II.3b., there
is a debt level, which is higher than the equilibrium debt level, where the amount of funds
invested in the diminishing-returns sector falls, while the borrower invests most funds in
the increasing-returns sector. Since all funds are invested, the difference between total
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investment, Y1 + D2 , and investment in the DRS sector, K 2N , is the investment in the IRS
sector, K 2M .
Once income is sufficiently large, the borrowers can get enough loans to make
investment in the IRS sector worthwhile. When the punishment fractions for default are
the same across sectors, there is a threshold income level that allows just enough debt so
that the borrower is indifferent between investing only in the DRS sector and investing in
both sectors such that the marginal products are equalized. As illustrated in Figures II.4a.
and II.4b., at such an income level, the lenders would be willing to give just enough loans
such that the borrower is not only indifferent between repaying and defaulting when
investing in the DRS sector, but the borrower is also indifferent between repaying and
defaulting while investing optimally in both sectors. A lower income level will lead to
less debt and will give the borrower an incentive to only invest in the DRS sector. A
higher income level will lead to more debt and will give the borrower an incentive to
mostly invest in the IRS sector.
It may not be obvious that there exists an income level that will allow the
borrower just enough debt to make it indifferent between repaying and defaulting at two
sets of investment levels, as illustrated in Figure II.4b. For a given income level, the
borrower will be given loans until it becomes indifferent between repaying and
defaulting; and depending on the income level, the highest debt that sets V d = V R may be
where the borrower invests only in the DRS sector, or it may be large enough for the
borrower to invest in the IRS sector. For the income level that yields enough debt to
make the borrower indifferent between repayment and default under DRS investment, if
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it gives the same utility for investing in both sectors and repaying, then it must also give
the same utility from investing in both sectors and defaulting. If the value of repayment
under only DRS investment is equal to the value of repayment when investment is made
in both sectors, it must mean that the output is the same at each set of investments. If the
value of default is equal to the value of repayment at one of those points, then it must be
the case that the value of default is equal the value of repayment at both points. If the
output is the same, and the punishment for default is the same fraction no matter which
investments took place, then the net output will be the same at both points. Therefore, we
have the situation in Figure II.4b., where the value of default and the value of repayment
are equal at two points at the threshold income level. We will see later that if we assume
different punishments across sectors, then we will have a different threshold since the
optimal investment composition depends on whether the borrower will default or repay
(in such a case, it is not obvious that ∂V R / ∂Y1 > ∂V d / ∂Y1 ).
At a lower income level than illustrated in Figures II.4a. and II.4b., the situation is
that of Figures II.3a. and II.3b., where the borrower is only given enough debt to set the
value of default equal to the value of repayment when investment is only in the DRS
sector. At a higher income level than in Figures II.4a. and II.4b., the highest debt that
achieves V d = V R will be where the borrower invests mostly in the IRS sector. Such an
equilibrium debt and the composition of investment are illustrated in Figures II.5a. and
II.5b.
In Figure II.5a., the borrower’s income is high enough so that it can get enough
debt to have an incentive to invest in the IRS sector. The value of default and the value
of repayment intersect after the kinks in the curves, which is where the borrower has
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enough funds to take advantage of the increasing returns. In Figure II.5b., we see that for
the given income and debt level, the borrower will choose to invest most funds in the IRS
sector (the difference between the two lines), where the marginal products are equalized
across sectors. When we assume the same punishment fraction across sectors, the curves
will never cross where the value of default and the value of repayment are on different
sides of the kink in the curves in Figure II.5a., where the borrower would be indifferent
between investing only in DRS sector and repaying and investing in both sectors and
defaulting. However, as we will see later, if we assume different punishments then we
can have such a case.
Equilibrium under different default punishments for each sector, n > z
As described earlier, the diminishing-returns sector may be more collateralized
than the increasing-returns sector. If a poor country invests in natural resources and lowskilled manufacturing, sectors from which poor countries tends to export, then defaulting
on a loan may lead to costly sanctions or possibly a seize of assets. If a poor country
instead invests in sectors such as infrastructure or education, then defaulting on an
international loan may not result in much punishment. For instance, oil revenues may be
easier to extract than a bridge or a school. Therefore, we should set n > z , and examine
the effect that has on equilibrium debt and investment composition.
If a borrower is very poor, then the equilibrium under different sector
punishments will look similar to Figures II.3a. and II.3b. The borrower will not have
enough income and debt to have an incentive to invest in the IRS sector. The lender will
give a loan that will make the borrower indifferent between repaying and defaulting, and
at a sufficiently low income level, the borrower will be indifferent between repaying and
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defaulting after investing only in the DRS sector. At a higher but still sufficiently low
income level, we get a result that differs from Figures II.3a. and II.3b. and from Figures
II.4a. and II.4b. The borrower may still not have enough income to get a large enough
loan to invest in the IRS sector, but the lenders may give a loan that makes the borrower
indifferent between investing in the DRS sector and repaying and investing mostly in the
IRS sector and defaulting.
As illustrated in Figure II.6a., the debt that makes the borrower indifferent
between repaying and defaulting is after the kink in the V d curve, but it is before the
kink in the V R curve. This means that at the equilibrium debt level, the highest value
from defaulting comes from investing mostly in the IRS sector, but the highest value
from repaying comes from investing everything in the DRS sector. When repaying,
utility is maximized by either investing where the marginal returns are equalized,
f ' N ( K 2N ) = f 'M ( K 2M ) , or where everything is invested in the DRS sector, whichever
yields the most gross output. When defaulting, utility is maximized by either investing
where the net marginal returns are equalized (1 − n)( f ' N +1) = (1 − z )( f ' M +1) , or where
everything is invested in the DRS sector, whichever yields the most net output. If n > z ,
then an interior maximum under default is achieved when the gross marginal return in the
DRS sector is higher than the gross marginal return in the IRS sector. Therefore, net
output under default may be higher when investment is mostly in the IRS sector, even if
gross output is greater when everything is invested in the DRS sector. At an income that
is almost high enough, but still insufficient to yield enough debt to invest in the IRS
sector, the borrower will be given enough loans such that they are indifferent between
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investing and repaying in the DRS sector and investing mostly in the IRS sector and
defaulting. In this example, the lenders do not want the borrower to invest in the IRS
sector because of the lack of punishment if the borrowers default after investment in that
sector.
In Figure II.6b., we see that the utility from repaying is maximized when all funds
are invested in the DRS sector, but utility from defaulting is maximized when most funds
are invested in the IRS sector and K 2ND is invested in the DRS sector, which is where the
net marginal returns are equalized. For very low income and debt levels, the utility from
repaying and the utility from defaulting are both maximized when investment is only in
the DRS sector, such as in Figures II.3a. and II.3b. At high levels of income, both the
utility from repaying and the utility from defaulting is maximized when most investment
is made in the IRS sector. Therefore, there exists some threshold income level that yields
just enough debt such that the borrower is indifferent between investing only in the DRS
sector and repaying, investing mostly in the IRS sector and repaying, and investing some
greater proportion in the IRS sector and defaulting. Such an income level is illustrated in
Figures II.7a. and II.7b.
As illustrated in Figure II.7a., the initial income is just large enough such that the
equilibrium debt level is at the kink in the V R curve, which means the borrower is
indifferent between investing everything in the DRS sector and repaying and investing
mostly in the IRS sector and repaying, and investing mostly in the IRS sector and
defaulting. There is no kink in the default curve in this example, which means the
borrower has enough initial income that it would always want to invest in the IRS sector
if it was to default. When output from the DRS sector is more collateralized than output
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from the IRS sector, then at the threshold income level the value from defaulting will be
maximized when most of the funds are invested in the IRS sector. This occurs because at
a given output level the borrower will get more net output from investing mostly in the
IRS sector under default since the IRS sector has less collateral. Therefore, while the
value of repayment from investing only in the DRS sector equals the value of repayment
from investing mostly in the DRS sector, the value of default from investing only in the
DRS sector is less than the value of default from investing mostly in the IRS sector.
Figure II.7b. shows the investment composition at a threshold income level under
different punishments across sectors. As we can see from the vertical dotted line, three
sets of investment levels achieve the same utility. The borrower can invest everything in
the DRS sector (set Y1 + D2 = K 2N and K 2M = 0 ) and repay, or the borrower can invest
mostly in the IRS sector where the marginal products are equalized and repay, or the
borrower can invest a greater proportion in the IRS sector where the net marginal
products are equalized (where (1 − n)( f ' N +1) = (1 − z )( f ' M +1) ) and default.

At that

given income level, any more debt and the borrower will have an incentive to invest
mostly in the IRS sector and default (under plausible parameters, ∂V d / ∂D2 > ∂V R / ∂D2 ).
If income was higher than the level illustrated in Figures II.7a. and II.7b., then the
borrower would be allowed enough debt to invest mostly in the IRS sector. In general,
however, when the IRS sector is less collateralized than the DRS sector, more income
doesn’t mean more debt, as will be illustrated later. However, once the borrower’s
income crosses the threshold level shown in Figures II.7a. and II.7b., more income will
allow for more debt and investment in the IRS sector, assuming plausible parameters. At
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a higher income level than portrayed in Figure II.7a., the V R curve will increase more
than the V d curve, which will allow for more debt.

It can be shown that

∂V R / ∂Y1 > ∂V d / ∂Y1 for any given reasonable parameters when comparing the interior

maximums or when comparing the case where everything is invested in the DRS sector.
However, when looking at the case where the borrower is getting just enough income to
have an incentive to invest in the IRS sector under default, then an income may not allow
for more debt, as will be shown later.
A Change in Collateral
With equal punishment fractions across sectors, n = z , it may be obvious that an
increase in punishment may allow a borrower to take advantage of increasing returns and
invest mostly in the IRS sector. For example, under equal punishments across sectors, if
the lenders could increase the punishment for default, the borrowers will be willing to
repay a larger amount of debt, which will allow for more loans and may give the
borrower an incentive to invest mostly in the IRS sector. If the borrower was near the
threshold as in Figure II.4a., then increasing the punishment will shift the V d curve down
and to the right in Figure II.4a., which will increase the equilibrium debt. The result
would then look like Figures II.5a. and II.5b., where the borrower has an incentive to
invest mostly in the IRS sector.
What may not be obvious, however, is that if the punishment is greater in the
DRS sector, n > z , then increasing punishment in the DRS sector may also allow the
borrower to contract for enough funds to invest mostly in the IRS sector, even if it means
that the borrower is investing less in the DRS sector than with the lower punishment.
Also, increasing n may actually decrease the total amount of collateral since the
60

borrowers may invest mostly in the IRS sector, of which a smaller fraction is collateral.
For instance, suppose that the income and punishment fractions gave the borrower an
incentive to invest only in the DRS sector, where the punishment for defaulting is
n( F N (Y1 + D2 ) + Y1 + D2 ) . Suppose at the equilibrium, as in Figures II.6a. and II.6b., the

borrower is given just enough debt to be indifferent between investing only in the DRS
sector and repaying and investing in both sectors and defaulting, which can be expressed
as
max V R = F N (Y1 + D2 ) + Y1 + D2 − (1 + r ) D2 =

max V d = (1 − n)[ F N (α (Y1 + D2 )) + α (Y1 + D2 )] + (1 − z )[ F M ((1 − α )(Y1 + D2 )) + (1 − α )(Y1 + D2 )] , (9)

where

α is the fraction of the funds that are invested in the DRS sector when the net

marginal returns are equalized across sectors. When n is increased, the maximum utility
from defaulting decreases since the borrower is receiving a smaller fraction from the
DRS sector output under default, and at the original debt level the maximum that can be
achieved from repaying exceeds the maximum that can be achieved from defaulting,
max V R > max V d .

If the utility from repayment is higher than the utility from

defaulting, the lenders can give more loans until the borrower becomes indifferent
between repaying and defaulting. As the amount of loans increase, both the value of
default and the value of repayment increases, with the value of defaulting increasing at a
higher rate than the value of repaying (again assuming ∂ max V R / ∂Y1 > ∂ max V d / ∂Y1 ,
which is true under any plausible parameters). A new equilibrium debt level may be
achieved where the borrower may have an incentive to invest in the IRS sector and repay.
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An increase in n is illustrated in Figure II.8. The dotted line represents the value
of default after an increase in punishment on output from the decreasing-returns sector.
At the old equilibrium debt level, D2* , the maximum value from repaying exceeds the
maximum value from defaulting after the increase in punishment for the decreasingreturns sector output under default. At the new equilibrium debt level, D2*′ in Figure II.8,
the borrower invests in both sectors such that the marginal returns are equalized,
f ' N ( K 2N ) = f 'M ( K 2M ) , and repays the debt. The borrower would also get the same utility

from investing in both sectors such that the net marginal returns are equalized,
(1 − n)( f ' N +1) = (1 − z )( f ' M +1) , and defaulting.

At the new equilibrium debt level, the

borrower would have defaulted at the old punishment fraction of the DRS sector output.
However, when n increases, the collateral for investment in both sectors is now high
enough to entice the borrower’s to repay, with the total punishment under default
equaling
n[ F N (α (Y1 + D2 )) + α (Y1 + D2 )] + z[ F M ((1 − α )(Y1 + D2 )) + (1 − α )(Y1 + D2 )].

(10)

Before the increase in n , if the borrower invested everything in the DRS sector
and did not repay, then the actual collateral taken by the lenders may be more than what
they could have taken if the borrower defaulted after the increase in n . The output from
the borrower will be more, but the fraction of output extracted by the lender under default
may be less than before since the IRS sector is not highly collateralized. Thus, an
increase in collateral in the DRS sector may actually decrease overall collateral, yet it still
may make it possible to sustain a contract for more funds, and possibly enough to take
advantage of increasing returns to scale.

Of course, having less collateral after an
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increase n is a little misleading. If the borrower defaults, the investment would be
different than if it repaid, and the punishment would be higher after the increase in n .
For example, suppose a contract added a clause that allowed the lending country
to seize oil export revenues in case of default on the loan. Adding this collateral would
increase the amount of the loan for any given contract in which the borrower would
produce (and export) oil. Further, suppose the borrower has been too poor to invest in
industries with increasing returns to scale, such as the case illustrated in Figures II.6a.
and II.6b. Before the added clause, lenders would not loan enough money for borrower
to invest in both sectors where the marginal products are equalized, since the borrower
has less collateral in the IRS sector and would have an incentive to default. However,
with the added punishment for default with oil output, the borrower may now have an
incentive to repay a loan that allows the borrower to invest in both the IRS and DRS (oil)
sector. This is possible since the portion that is invested in oil production, when marginal
products are equalized, is punished at a higher fraction than before the clause. Before the
clause, if the borrower invested in both sectors, it would default, but adding more
punishment in the DRS sector could bring down the utility from default just enough to
make repayment optimal. The result from including the possibility of expropriating oil
exports may be less oil produced, since a lot of funds are now invested in other sectors,
but the borrower will still get a larger loan and achieve higher overall output. The total
collateral that can be seized by the lenders under default may actually decrease because
the output from the IRS sectors may have less collateral than the DRS sector. However,
if the borrower would have defaulted before the clause, it would have invested in both
sectors, but after the clause the punishment for such an investment increases. In previous
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models, increasing the punishment for default benefits the borrower, but in this model it
can also shift investment to more productive sectors, and the increase in punishment can
have a more substantial impact because of increasing returns to scale.
II.IV. Income and Debt
After analyzing the possible contracts under different initial income levels, we can
now describe a general relationship between initial income and debt. In Figure II.9., the
relationship between initial income and debt is drawn, given that the DRS sector is more
collateralized than the IRS sector, n > z . A borrower with an initial income of zero can
still contract for some funds, given that the initial returns are very high in the DRS sector,
and subsequently the punishment for default is high since the lender will take a fraction
of the output. For higher levels of initial income, up to Y11 , the amount of collateral
increases, and the returns are high, so the amount of loans increase. In this range, the
borrowers are investing only in the DRS sector since they do not have enough funds to
take advantage of increasing returns. Because of diminishing marginal returns, the curve
is concave, since the punishment will increase with more income and investment, but at a
diminishing rate.
Once initial income surpasses the level Y11 , the amount of debt will decrease until
it reaches the level Y12 . When a borrowing country has an initial income of Y11 , it is
indifferent between investing everything in the DRS sector and repaying, investing
everything in the DRS sector and defaulting, and investing in both sectors (where
(1 − n)( f ' N +1) = (1 − z )( f ' M +1) ) and defaulting. To put in another way, the income is just

high enough such that the highest debt that the borrower can be trusted to repay allows
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for just enough funds to make the borrower indifferent between investing in just the DRS
sector and investing mostly in the IRS sector and defaulting. Note that at this point, the
value of repaying when investing in both sectors will be lower than when defaulting
because at a given output level the punishment will be lower when funds are invested in
the IRS sector. As initial incomes increase above Y11 , the borrowers needs less debt to
have an incentive to invest in the IRS sector and default. While the borrower initially has
more income to be extracted under default, if the borrower has an incentive to invest in
the IRS sector, the fraction of the output that will be extracted will be less than the
fraction that would be extracted when all investment is in the DRS sector (in this case we
are comparing two different sectors, and it is possible to have ∂V R / ∂Y1 < ∂V d / ∂Y1 ).
2
Between initial incomes Y11 and Y1 , the lender does not want the borrower to invest

anything in the IRS sector because the borrower will not have an incentive to repay.
Therefore, as incomes increase in this range, debt will decrease.
2
After the income level Y1 , initial income is positively related to debt. For a
2
borrowing country who has an initial income of Y1 , it receives loans such that it is

indifferent between investing all funds in the DRS sector and repaying, investing most
funds in the IRS sector and repaying, and investing even more funds in the IRS sector
and defaulting. Such an income and debt level was illustrated in Figures II.7a. and II.7b.
2
As income increases from Y1 , utility from investing in both sectors will exceed utility

from investing only in the DRS sector, regardless as to whether the borrower defaults or
repays. Given that investment is in both sectors, when income increases, the value of
repayment increases more than the value of default (under plausible parameters), and
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more debt will be allowed to the borrowers. As diminishing marginal returns set in, the
punishment for default increases at a diminishing rate, so the equilibrium debt will
increase at a diminishing rate.
Note that this relationship between initial income and debt supports a twin-peak
world income distribution. The poor countries that can only get enough debt to invest in
the sectors that exhibit diminishing returns will converge because the debt decreases
between Y11 and Y12 . Growth would then take off for those incomes above Y12 because
debt and income will be positively related. Divergence can then exist between a country
with an initial income between Y11 and Y12 , and a country with an initial income above Y12
. Thus, initial income and sovereign debt can lead to twin peaks in world income if there
is increasing returns with low punishment for default.
Foreign Aid and Lending: Substitutes or Complements?
From the relationship between initial income and debt, we can analogously
examine the effectiveness of foreign aid.

In some cases, foreign aid can decrease

international lending, but in other cases, foreign aid can lead to more lending, as we can
observe from the relationship between income and debt in Figure II.9. For incomes lower
than Y11 , more foreign aid leads to more debt, until the sum of the foreign aid and initial
income equals Y11 . For initial incomes above Y11 , the equilibrium debt is just enough to
make the borrower indifferent between investing in the DRS sector and repaying and
investing in both sectors and defaulting. Since the increasing-returns sector becomes
more attractive as the amount of funds increase, for a given equilibrium debt level, a
small amount of aid will give the borrower an incentive to invest in the IRS sector and
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default, instead of investing everything in the DRS sector and repaying. Therefore, for
initial incomes between Y11 and Y12 in Figure II.9., the amount of debt will decrease if aid
is increased and if the sum of the aid and initial income does not surpass Y12 . In fact, as
illustrated in Figure II.9., if the initial income is between Y11 and Y12 , aid will only
increase debt if the aid is so large that it brings the income level above Y12 to the point
that it yields more loans.
For initial incomes greater than Y12 , an increase in foreign aid will increase the
available funds for the borrower. At Y12 , the borrower receives just enough loans so that
it is indifferent between investing all funds in the DRS sector and repaying, investing
most funds in the IRS sector and repaying, and investing even more funds in the IRS
sector and defaulting. Any foreign aid will give the borrower an incentive to invest in
both sectors and repay, assuming ∂ max V R / ∂Y1 > ∂ max V d / ∂Y1 , which again is true under
any plausible parameters. Therefore, if the initial income for the borrowing country is
equal to or greater than Y12 , any amount of aid will increase the loans that the borrower
can be trusted to repay.
In summary, foreign aid and foreign debt will be complements for very low
income levels, between zero and Y11 , if the aid is small or if the aid is so large that it
surpasses Y12 enough to allow for more debt. In the same income range, foreign aid and
foreign debt can be substitutes if the aid is enough (but not too much) to give the
borrower an incentive to invest in the IRS sector and default. For example, as can be
seen in Figure II.9., if the initial income is just below Y11 , then some aid, such as an
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amount that brings income to just below Y12 , will lead to less debt. For initial incomes
between Y11 and Y12 , foreign aid and foreign debt will be substitutes when the aid is small,
but complements if the aid is large enough. For incomes above Y12 , foreign debt and
foreign aid will be complements.
II.V. Sector-Controlled Loans
How would things change if the foreign lenders could control how their loans get
invested? In many cases, we can imagine that lenders do have some control as to where
their funds get invested. For instance, we can think of the lenders as the ones directly
purchasing the physical capital, for which the borrowers then have to repay (or not), such
as the case when someone is financing the purchase of a car. The borrower, therefore,
cannot easily shift those funds to an alternative investment. In this model, with no capital
flight or secret consumption, a sufficiently poor country with income below Y11 will not
gain if the lender can control where the sovereign invests the borrowed funds.

A

sufficiently poor country will get enough debt such that it is indifferent between repaying
and defaulting after investing all funds in the DRS sector. It cannot get enough debt to
have an incentive to invest some funds in the IRS sector, since the IRS sector has low
initial returns and the value of defaulting will exceed the value of repayment if the
borrower was given enough debt to overcome the initial low returns. The borrower could
invest its initial income how it sees fit, but it would not get any higher utility from
investing any of its own funds in the IRS sector. Therefore, for a very poor country,
controlling which sector the funds go to will not help.
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If the funds are monitored for the borrowers who have an initial income between
Y11 and Y12 in Figure II.9., the borrowers may or may not be better off than if none of the

funds are monitored. Whether or not the borrower becomes better off, and how much it
becomes better off, depends on the assumptions about the production functions and the
assumptions about the way the loan is bargained. Again, when a borrowing country has
an initial income of Y11 , it is indifferent between investing everything in the DRS sector
and repaying, investing everything in the DRS sector and defaulting, and investing in
both sectors (where (1 − n)( f ' N +1) = (1 − z )( f 'M +1) ) and defaulting. For a borrower whose
initial income level lies just above Y11 , if the funds were not monitored, the borrower
would get a loan amount that would make it indifferent between investing everything in
the DRS sector and repaying and investing in both sectors and defaulting, such as the
case illustrated in Figures II.6a. and II.6b. If the loans were monitored, the result would
only be different if the lender could give more loans and prevent the borrower from
investing in both sectors and defaulting. The lender could do this if the debt is higher
than the amount of funds that the borrower would have invested in the DRS sector under
default. If the lender could force more funds in the DRS sector than the amount that the
borrower would have invested under default, then the borrower may have an incentive to
repay.
For example, in Figure II.10., the borrower will be allowed enough debt until the
amount of debt equals the amount of investment in the DRS sector that the borrower
would have invested if it defaulted and received the same utility as repayment under all
investment in the DRS sector. In the figure, as we go from left to right, the amount of
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capital invested in the IRS sector increases from zero to Y1 + D2 . As we go from right to
left, capital invested in the DRS sector increases from zero to Y1 + D2 . On the vertical
axis, utility from defaulting and repaying is measured. The box is for a given income and
debt level. We can see from the horizontal dotted line in the figure that if K 2N = D2 the
*

utility from defaulting at that point equals the utility from repaying when all funds are
invested in the DRS sector. If the debt was smaller than K 2N in Figure II.10. (keeping
*

total investment fixed), the borrower could invest less in the DRS sector, more in the IRS
sector, and achieve a higher utility from defaulting. If the debt was larger than K 2N in
*

Figure II.10., the lender can allow even more funds since it could force those funds to be
invested in the DRS sector, and the borrower would then have an incentive to repay. As
debt increases, the curves shift up (and lengthen), with the value of default increasing
more than the value of repayment at each given debt level. Therefore, at some debt level,
the value of repayment will equal the value of default when all the funds are invested in
the DRS sector. Once debt reaches such a threshold, controlling the sector in which the
loans are invested will not help since default will be more attractive at each investment
set that includes investment in the IRS sector.
For income levels above Y12 in Figure II.9., just as for lower income levels,
controlling which sectors the loan is invested in will be beneficial only if the loan is a
large enough portion of the total funds invested when the IRS sector becomes attractive
to invest in. As we will also see, the degree at which the borrower benefits will depend
on how the loan is negotiated in the first place. Again, at Y12 , with no monitoring, the
borrower receives just enough loans so that it is indifferent between investing all funds in
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the DRS sector and repaying, investing most funds in the IRS sector and repaying, and
investing even more funds in the IRS sector and defaulting, as illustrated in Figures II.7a.
and II.7b. For higher income levels than Y12 , without monitoring, the borrower receives
just enough loans so that it is indifferent between investing most funds in the IRS sector
and repaying and investing even more of its funds in the IRS sector and defaulting. Any
more debt than equilibrium, without monitoring, will give the borrower an incentive to
invest most funds in the IRS sector and default. If the loans are monitored, the lender
may be able to prevent the borrower from investing too much in the IRS, and in doing so,
allow even more loans to the borrower than if the loans were not monitored.
Suppose that the borrower has an initial income a little above Y12 , so that it is
given enough debt to be indifferent between investing most funds in the IRS sector and
repaying and investing even more funds in the IRS sector and defaulting (imagine a debt
a little higher than shown in Figure II.7b.). If the lender could control more than the
amount that the borrower was going to invest in the DRS sector without monitoring, then
the lender can give more loans that will be repaid. It may turn out however, as will be
shown, given that the DRS sector is more collateralized than the IRS sector, the lenders
may want a bigger debt level than the borrower would like to obtain. The equilibrium
debt level would then depend on how the loan is negotiated.
Take for example, Figures II.11a. and II.11b. In Figure II.11a., the borrower is
given some loans, some are forced to be invested in the DRS sector, and the borrower
invests the rest in the IRS sector. The horizontal line is where the value of repayment
equals the value of repayment, and the amount of debt must be at least as large as the
DRS investment in order for that point to be a possible contract. As we can see, if funds
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were not monitored, the borrower would invest more in the IRS sector and default.
However, if the loans in Figure II.11a. exceeded the amount of DRS investment where
the value of default equaled the value of repayment, the lenders can give more loans and
force more of it in the DRS sector, as in Figure II.11b. Even though the borrowers can
invest more from the additional loans, if it means that the lenders can make the
investment go in the DRS sector, the borrowers may actually be worse off.

The

horizontal line shows the utility received when the debt is at the lower level in Figure
II.11a., which is higher than when the debt is higher in Figure II.11b. If the lender could
control a large amount of the funds, they may want to give more loans than the borrowers
would prefer. The amount of loans, therefore, depends on how the loans are negotiated.
If the lender could give the borrower an ultimatum, then the borrower would take the
loans since it is better than nothing. If the borrower could negotiate, then the borrower
may want to accept a lower amount of debt, be able to invest more of it in the more
productive sector, and achieve a higher net output than with a larger loan. With a larger
loan, the borrower will be forced to invest most of it in the less productive sector, which
can be worse for the borrower than a smaller loan that is invested mostly in the IRS
sector.
II.VI. Conclusions
The objective of this paper is to analyze the effects of increasing returns and
collateral differences on a sovereign borrower. The purpose of this analysis is to help
explain why poor countries may invest in less productive sectors than rich countries, give
a reason why the world income distribution can have twin peaks, and explain the
effectiveness of alternative policies to help increase investment and output in the poor
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countries. Many other papers have also used a two-sector economy to explain differences
in economic growth, including the “Dutch disease” literature. This paper differs from
those in that the mechanism which inhibits growth is initial income, sovereign risk, and
collateral differences across sectors. Poor countries do not suffer from a resource curse
in this model, but instead they heavily invest in natural resources because they do not
have enough initial income and they cannot attain enough debt to invest in the sectors
that have increasing returns. This paper argues that a main reason holding the borrower
from investing in the more productive sector could be the lack of collateral in such
sectors. Investments in infrastructure, research and development, education, and health
may pay off handsomely if a large amount of funds are allocated to those sectors.
However, international lenders may not be interested in loaning funds for such
investments since a sovereign borrower may not be held accountable if they default after
investing in those sectors. For instance, a lender may have a difficult time extracting a
road or a school. However, if loans go towards investing in natural resources, a sector
that a poor sovereign borrower may heavily export, the lender may find it easier to punish
the borrower under default. Sectors such as natural resources or agriculture may have
high initial returns, but those returns are diminishing as the resources become scarce.
The results from this paper suggest different policy implications for different
income levels. For example, the poorest of the poor would benefit significantly from
foreign aid, as it would also increase foreign lending because of the increase in collateral.
However, the poorest countries would not benefit from perfect monitoring of investment
in this model, since the borrower will only have an incentive to invest in the DRS sector
regardless of whether or not the lenders can control where the funds go. For poor
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countries that have a little more income, some foreign aid may not significantly help
because it may lead to fewer loans, since the borrower may have an incentive to invest
less in the collateralized sector and more in the less-collateralized sector and default. At
these income levels, policies that will improve monitoring of investment may help
increase investment and output since the lenders may be able to prevent the borrower
from investing in sectors that are less collateralized, and as a result the lender will give
more loans.
For the countries that have enough income and debt to invest in the IRS sector
and repay, they will be significantly helped by foreign aid because it will increase
collateral and allow them to take advantage of increasing returns. Improving monitoring
of investment could increase investment, but it could also lead to excess lending. For
instance, if the lenders had control over which sectors the funds were invested in, they
may require all loans go in the DRS sector, while the borrower may be better off if they
received less loans but could invest a large portion of the funds in the IRS sector.
At all income levels, as in previous studies, increasing punishment for default will
help the borrower. However, the significant difference in this paper is that it shows how
an increase in punishment for default from output in the low productivity sector may
actually decrease investment and output in the that sector, while increasing investment
and output in the high productivity sector. Since the borrower will always want to invest
at least some funds in the DRS sector, increasing punishment for default in that sector
will increase the collateral for any investment portfolio that includes investment in the
DRS sector.

Before an increase in punishment in the diminishing-returns sector, a

borrower may have not been allowed enough debt to have an incentive to invest in a
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portfolio that included mostly investment in the IRS sector, with little investment in the
DRS sector. However, an increase in punishment in the DRS sector may give the
borrower an incentive to invest in mostly in the IRS sector and repay since the collateral
from the investment in the DRS sector is high enough.
In summary, this paper helps explain how some poor countries can be inherently
stuck investing in less productive sectors because of sovereign debt problems. The paper
also discusses the effects of possible policies that can be taken to alleviate the problems
with sovereign debt and increase investment and output in the poor countries. However,
the results of this paper suggest that countries at different income levels will be affected
differently from the same policies.
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Figure II.1. Production Function of the IRS and the DRS Sector
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Notes: Output in the diminishing-returns sector (DRS), F N ( K 2N ) , or natural resource
sector, increases as investment in that sector increases, but at a diminishing rate. The
initial marginal product is high, but it goes down as the resources are extracted. Output
in the increasing-returns sector (IRS), F M ( K 2M ) , or manufacturing sector, has a low
marginal product at low levels of investment, but output initially increases at an
increasing rate. At high levels of investment, the IRS sector is more productive than the
DRS sector.
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Figure II.2: Equilibrium Investment Composition
given an Income and Debt Level

f ' N ( K 2N ) = f 'M ( K 2M )

K 2N

B

G
0

I
K 2M

Notes: Given an initial income and a debt level, the borrower can invest their funds in
the IRS sector, K 2M , or DRS sector, K 2N , and the possible combination is represented by

I . If the fraction of income extracted under default is the same across sectors, and the

borrower has enough income and debt, the optimal investment will equalize the marginal
products across sectors, f ' N ( K 2N ) = f 'M ( K 2M ) . Points B and G are where all funds are
invested and the marginal products are equalized.
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Figures II.3a. and II.3b. Equilibrium Debt and Investment Composition Levels for a
Sufficiently Poor Country
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D2
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Notes: In Figure II.3a., the maximum value of default and the maximum value of
repayment are given as a function of debt for a given initial income level. Figure II.3b.
illustrates the relationship between debt and the composition of investment.
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Figures II.4a. and II.4b. Equilibrium Debt and Investment Composition Levels for a
Threshold Income Level

Vd

V R ,V d

VR

M
2

K ,K

D2

N
2

K 2M + K 2N = Y1 + D2
K 2N
K 2N

D2

D2*

Notes: In Figure II.4a., the maximum value of default and the maximum value of
repayment are given as a function of debt for a given initial income level. Figure II.4b.
illustrates the relationship between debt and the composition of investment.
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Figures II.5a. and II.5b. Equilibrium Debt and Investment Composition Levels for a
Sufficiently High Income Level
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Notes: In Figure II.5a., the maximum value of default and the maximum value of
repayment are given as a function of debt for a given initial income level. Figure II.5b.
illustrates the relationship between debt and the composition of investment.
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Figures II.6a. and II.6b. Equilibrium Debt and Investment Composition Levels for a Poor
Country under Collateral Differences across Sectors
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Notes: In Figure II.6a., the maximum value of default and the maximum value of
repayment are given as a function of debt for a given initial income level. Figure II.6b.
illustrates the relationship between debt and the composition of investment.
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Figures II.7a. and II.7b. Equilibrium Debt and Investment Composition Levels for a
Threshold Country under Collateral Differences across Sectors
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Notes: In Figure II.7a., the maximum value of default and the maximum value of
repayment are given as a function of debt for a given initial income level. Figure II.7b.
illustrates the relationship between debt and the composition of investment.
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Figure II.8. Equilibrium Debt after an Increase in Punishment in the
Decreasing-Returns Sector
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Notes: In Figure II.8., the value of defaulting decreases because of the increase in
punishment from DRS-sector output. Since an optimal investment portfolio always
includes some DRS investment (because of the initial high returns), every possible
investment by the borrower can be punished more severely. More debt is allowed, and
the borrower in this case now has an incentive to invest in both sectors.
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Figure II.9. Income and Debt when Decreasing-Returns Sector is more Collateralized

D2

D2 (Y1 )

Y11
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Notes: Figure II.9. shows the relationship between income and debt when the
diminishing-returns sector is more collateralized than the increasing-returns sector. As
income increases from zero to Y11 , debt increases because of the increase in the collateral.
As income surpasses Y11 , debt decreases because the lender does not want the borrower to
invest in the less–collateralized IRS sector and default. As income surpasses Y12 , debt
increases as the borrower is given debt to invest in the IRS, and the high returns increases
punishment enough to support loans.
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Figure II.10. Investment Composition with the Equilibrium Debt Level under
Sector-Controlled Loans
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Notes: Figure II.10. shows the value from default and repayment given an initial income
and sector-controlled loans. Looking at the figure, we can see that the borrower would
prefer to invest more than K 2M in the IRS sector and default. However, if the lender could
force K 2N of the funds to be in the DRS sector, then the borrower will not have an
incentive to default. If K 2N = D2 , then we are at equilibrium. If the lender gave more
loans, the borrower would default because the value from defaulting will increase more
than the value from repayment, under reasonable parameters (and the figure will expand).
If debt is less than the investment in the DRS sector, then the lenders are forgoing profit.
*

*

*
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Figure II.11a. Optimal Debt for the
Borrower when the Lenders can Control
the Sector where the Loans are Invested
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Figure II.11b. Optimal Investment for
the Lenders when they can Control the
Sector where the Loans are Invested

0

V R ,V d

0

VR

VR

0

K 2N

Vd

Vd

0

K 2M

K 2M

Notes: Given the same parameters, Figure II.11a. is an example of an optimal debt
contract for a borrower if the lender can control where the loans are invested, while
Figure I.11b. is an example of an optimal debt contract for a lender. In Figure II.11a., the
borrower is given funds such that they are allowed to invest heavily in the IRS sector,
where the value of default equals the value of repayment. However, in Figure II.11a., if
the loans exceed the amount of capital invested in the DRS sector, the lender may give
more loans that will be repaid (see Figure II.10. for explanation).
As the debt increases, both the value of default and the value of repayment increases,
with the value of default increasing more at each investment set. Since the DRS sector is
more collateralized, as debt increases, the value of repayment will exceed the value of
default only if most of the investment is in the DRS sector. If the debt equals the amount
invested in the DRS sector where the curves intersect in Figure II.11b., the lenders have
maxed out the amount of loans they can give that will be repaid. In this example, the
borrower was better off in Figure II.11a., where they received less loans than in Figure
II.11b., because in Figure II.11a., they were allowed to invest more heavily in the IRS
sector than in Figure II.11b.
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III. INCREASING RETURNS, INSTITUTIONS, AND CAPITAL FLOWS
III.I. Introduction
Poor, capital scarce countries should attract more capital flows than rich, capital
abundant countries under the assumption of diminishing marginal productivity of capital.
However, the data clearly show that capital predominantly flows to the rich countries.
This phenomenon, which is sometimes referred to as the Lucas Paradox (Lucas 1990),
has generated many theoretical explanations. Some studies have tried to explain this
phenomenon by pointing to differences across countries that could affect the productivity
of capital, such as differences in institutions and human capital, while other studies have
focused on other factors that may restrict international capital flows, such as asymmetric
information, sovereign risk, and transaction costs. While there are numerous theoretical
explanations, there are a relatively few number of empirical studies of international
capital flows and the macroeconomic fundamentals suggested by the theories.
Of particular interest in this paper, will be the role of initial capital and
institutions in attracting capital flows. This paper will follow a similar procedure to that
of Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych (2008), but different variables will be used as
a measure of institutional quality. As will be shown, institutions play a key role in
attracting capital flows, but this finding does not resolve the Lucas Paradox. My results
are in contrast to the study by Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych (referred to as
AKV for the rest of the paper), which concludes that initial capital does not affect capital
inflows. In fact, I show that initial capital is positively correlated with capital inflows,
even when controlling for institutions and other factors that can influence capital inflows.
In addition, and in contrast to AKV and other studies, I compare a sample of poor
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countries with a sample of rich countries, and I find that the main determinants of capital
flows for poor countries are different from the main determinants of capital flows for the
rich countries.
To decide which variables to include as the fundamental determinants of capital
flows, I follow AKV and look at the different theories of why the data do not support the
standard models of economic growth. In a typical economic growth model, as in Solow
(1956), if countries operate with the same technology with constant returns, with the
individual marginal products of capital and labor diminishing, the countries with less
capital (poor countries) will get a higher marginal return to capital. Following this logic,
if individuals seek to get the highest return on their capital, they would invest in the
poorest countries. Obviously, the data suggest there is something wrong with these
models or assumptions, since capital has predominately flowed to rich, capital abundant
countries. I will now briefly discuss a few of the possible remedies to the standard model
suggested by the theories, and how I will incorporate them in my estimation.
One possible reason why capital has not flowed to the poor countries is
differences in human capital. As discussed in the classic work by Lucas (1990), capital
may not flow to poor countries if the labor force, for a given amount of capital, is less
productive in the poor countries.

In addition, human capital may be subject to

externalities, where the productivity of one worker may influence the productivity of
another worker. To account for differences in human capital, I include a measurement of
schooling as an explanatory variable.

Since I am including initial Gross Domestic

Product (GDP) also as an explanatory variable, which is highly correlated with schooling,
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one would think that the coefficient on initial GDP would diminish, but as will be shown,
the significance of initial GDP’s impact on capital flows remains strong.
Poor institutions in developing countries may also deter capital flows. According
to Douglass North (1994), “Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure
human interaction. They are made up of formal constraints (e.g., rules, laws,
constitutions), informal constraints (e.g., norms of behavior, conventions, self-imposed
codes of conduct), and their enforcement characteristics. Together they define the
incentive structure of societies and specifically economies.” As will be detailed later, I
use numerous measures of institutional quality to account for different institutions across
countries. Institutional quality is also highly correlated with initial GDP, which again
one would expect to diminish the significance of initial GDP’s impact on capital flows,
but as we will see from the regression results, the significance of GDP is robust in the
World sample. I will also instrument for institutions using log European settler mortality,
made famous by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), but we will see that initial
GDP remains significant.
Along with different institutions, international investment suffers from sovereign
risk and asymmetric information. If investing internationally in a foreign country, a
typical investor is not only less familiar with the foreign country’s environment than with
his own, including its rules and regulations, but he may not have a strong recourse if the
sovereign nation defaults or refuses to follow through on a contract. In a classic textbook
model of sovereign debt, as in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), a poor sovereign borrower
may not be able to obtain enough loans to invest efficiently since it cannot commit to
repay the loans. Reputation may also play a key role, and some investors may shy away
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from countries who have defaulted in the past (see Tomz, 2007; Reinhart and Rogoff,
2004; Bulow and Rogoff, 1989; and Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981). Theoretically, a poor
country may not have an incentive to efficiently invest foreign loans in the domestic
economy, but instead secretly buy risk-free securities (i.e., capital flight), default on the
loans, and avoid the punishment by feigning bankruptcy, as described in Gertler and
Rogoff (1990). Most of these explanations rely on weak contract enforcement, which is
incorporated in the institutional composite variables used in this empirical investigation.
Geography and infrastructure may also help explain the lack of international capital flows
to poor countries. The return on capital may be lower when accounting for the cost of
transport (also see Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000), who relate transport and trade costs in
goods to the lack of capital flows). Since infrastructure and geographical location may
play a key role in productivity and capital flows, they will be included as explanatory
variables in the regression. However, as with education and institutions, infrastructure is
highly correlated with initial GDP, which one would think would diminish the
significance of the impact of initial GDP on capital flows, but as we will see, the
coefficient is still significant in the World sample when including all of the above
explanatory variables.
The above reasons may not sufficiently explain the lack of capital flows to poor
countries. Including infrastructure, institutions, and education as explanatory variables
may pick up some externalities associated with being developed, but it may not entirely
pick up the source of increasing returns. Several studies suggest learning-by-doing and
industrialization as a source of increasing returns, as in Romer (1986), Krugman (1987),
and Matsuyama (1992). Controlling for education may not fully pick up human capital
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differences and advantages of producing in a developed market. However, it may be
possible to pick up the effect of industrialization, or moving out of an agricultural
economy. To control for industrialization, I will include as an explanatory variable the
percentage of GDP that comes from agriculture. The surprising result, as I will show, is
that initial GDP still has a significant impact on capital flows in the World sample, even
when controlling industrialization and the previously mentioned variables.
The explanation for the persistence of increasing returns may be simple.
Economies of scale may inherently exist in the most productive sectors, as I described in
chapter II. Countries with enough capital may invest in sectors with high fixed costs (or
low initial returns), that may yield a better return than other sectors that only require a
small investment. For example, investing in infrastructure or manufacturing may only be
profitable if a large amount of capital is used, while agriculture or natural resource
extraction may require less initial capital to be profitable.

If sovereign risk and

asymmetric information constrain capital flows, initial capital may play a key role in
attracting foreign investment. A country with a high initial capital endowment may
attract more capital flows than a country with a low initial capital, since the poor country
would have to borrow too much (to be worth the risk) to invest in the productive sectors.
To see this clearly, I will show that increasing returns may be explained away if we
divide the sample and compare the rich countries with the poor countries. Within the
poor group, there may be no increasing returns; within the rich group, there may be no
increasing returns; but within the World sample, increasing returns exists as countries
move to more productive sectors with higher income levels.
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In the next section, I show the estimates from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). In
Section III., I discuss endogeneity, and I show the results from two-stage least squares. I
summarize the results in Section IV., and I discuss the policy implications. The data is
described in the appendix.
III.II. Data and Ordinary Least Squares
Capital Flows and initial GDP
The dependent variable is capital inflows.

For the measurement of capital

inflows, I use foreign direct investment (FDI) and portfolio equity investment from the
International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics (IFS).

If a foreign

investor purchases 10 percent or more of the firm’s securities, it is considered foreign
direct investment; otherwise, it is considered portfolio equity investment.

I do not

include debt flows since they may include government decisions, and they may not
reflect market decisions.

Similar to the procedure used by AKV, I take the annual

average of FDI plus portfolio investment from 1970 to 2008 (or most recent year).
Figure III.1. displays the relationship between capital inflows and initial GDP,
without controlling for any other variables. As a measurement of initial capital, I use real
GDP per capita from 1970 (Penn World Tables).
significant.

The relationship is positive and

For a country that has 100 dollars more in initial income per capita (1996

base year), it receives on average 4.5 dollars more in annual capital inflows per capita.
Note that the levels of GDP are used, not log GDP, which was used in the study by AKV.
Log GDP does not fit the data as well as the levels of GDP, which may be a contributing
factor for why AKV found the coefficient on log GDP insignificant when controlling for
institutional quality. Model 1A from Table III.1 displays the results from the regression
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shown in Figure III.1. Initial GDP is highly correlated with capital inflows, as shown by
the adjusted R-squared of 0.64.
The relationship between initial GDP and capital inflows is not a simple linear
relationship. We can see from Figure III.1. that the variance increases as initial GDP
increases until GDP nears $5000, and then the variance remains relatively stable. 4 Upon
closer inspection, initial GDP and capital flows seem to be weakly correlated until initial
GDP surpasses $2500, and then capital flows and initial GDP seem to be strongly
correlated when initial GDP is greater than $2500. Conveniently, this break point occurs
around the median initial income level, which allows enough observations on each side to
compare each half with separate regressions. 5
Figures III.2a. and II.2b. show the dramatic difference in the relationship between
the initial income and capital inflows between the two groups. Table III.1. shows the
correlation between initial GDP and capital inflows for each group in Models 2A and 3A,
before controlling for other variables that might affect capital inflows. 53 countries are in
the poorest half and 54 countries are in the richest half.

For the poorest half, the

coefficient for initial GDP is positive and significant, but it is very weak. For every
additional $100 in initial income, a “poor” country attracts an additional $0.94 in annual
capital flows. Initial GDP does not explain much of the variation in capital inflows for
the poor countries, as shown with an adjusted R-squared of 0.077.

4

Correcting for heteroskedasticity does not change the significance of any of the estimates, so the
uncorrected OLS estimates are shown for ease of replicability.

5

Shifting the breakpoint a little doesn’t make much difference, but a significant change would make the
number of observations too low to compare each group, especially when introducing log settler mortality as
an instrument.
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For the richest half, the story is very different. With initial GDP as the only
explanatory variable, it explains about half of the variation in the capital inflows. For
every additional $100 in initial GDP, a “rich” country receives an additional $4.70 in
capital inflows. A country in the rich group receives nearly five times more capital flows
than a country in the poor group for every additional $100 in initial GDP. Figure III.3.
gives us another perspective on the difference between the two groups. For each group, a
quadratic equation is estimated. From Figure III.3., we can see the sharp distinction from
the two groups. Note that the concave shapes do not represent diminishing marginal
productivity of capital, since that would occur if the slopes were negative. However, we
can see that the positive, or increasing returns, start to decline as initial GDP increases,
especially for the poorest group.
Explaining Increasing Returns
According to previous theories, increasing returns, or North to North capital
flows, can be explained by controlling for other variables. In the study by AKV, they
conclude that institutions can eliminate this paradox. As a measure of Institutions, I use
the data set from the Economic Freedom of the World 2009 Report (Gwartney and
Lawson 2009). In the study by AKV, they use a measurement of institutional quality for
the years 1984 to 2000 from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), The PRS
Group. I argue that the data from the Freedom Report have a few advantages over the
ICRG. One advantage is that the Freedom Report dates back to 1970 instead of 1984.
Another advantage is that each component, generally speaking, is a measurement of
economic freedom (or lack of restrictions or interference from government), which is not
necessarily derived from being a developed or rich country.
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Therefore, it may be

possible to extract more independent effects from initial GDP and institutions.
Measurements of risk or institutional quality from the ICRG may be partially derived
from the development of the country, and it may be more difficult to separate the
independent effects from initial GDP and institutions.
As a starting point, similar to AKV, I use a composite variable of institutions from
1970 to 2008 (or most recent year). Institutional variables are rated from 0 to 10, where
10 is the most free, least restrictive, or least interfered with by the government. The
composite variable of institutions is an average of the other institutional variables, which
includes measures such as government size and taxes, property rights, inflation, tariffs,
and regulations. The appendix lists the components of each institutional variable. 6 Table
III.2., Model 1B shows the regression with only initial GDP and institutions as the
explanatory variables. The coefficient on initial GDP is significant at the 1% level, but
the coefficient on institutions is not significant. Possibly, the insignificant coefficient on
institutions could exist because of multicollinearity (which I also examine later), so in
Model 2B I take out initial GDP and leave only institutions as the explanatory variable.
Now, the coefficient on the institutions variable is significant at the 1% level, where an
increase of 1 point on the 0-10 scale is associated with an increase of $151 of annual
capital flows per capita. Using only the composite (average) variable for institutions, we
can see that it does not explain as much of the variation of capital inflows as with the
regression with initial GDP as the only explanatory variable. Of course, it is possible that
the exclusion of other explanatory variables has biased the results, so I will now include

6

For a complete description of how each component was constructed, please see the appendix of the
Economic Freedom of the World Report.
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other variables suggested by the theory, and we will see that the coefficients on both
institutions and initial GDP remain similar to the results in Model 1B.
As discussed in the theory, human capital may play a key role in increasing the
marginal productivity of capital and attracting capital flows. To pick up some of the
effects of human capital on capital flows, I include average years of total schooling for
aged 25 and older from 1970 to 2000, obtained from Barro and Lee (2000).
Infrastructure may also be essential to explaining increasing returns, since it may make
capital more productive.

To control for different infrastructure across countries, I use

average annual percentage of roads that are paved from 1990 to 2008 (World Bank,
World Development Indicators). 7

As an indicator of transportation costs (besides

infrastructure), I borrow variables from Gallup and Sachs (1999), such as being
landlocked (not in Europe) and air distance from the capital-goods-supplying regions: the
U.S., Western Europe, and Japan (specifically, the distance from the country’s capital
city to New York, Rotterdam, or Tokyo).

As mentioned earlier, the marginal

productivity of capital can be higher in countries that are industrialized than in those
countries that rely heavily on natural resources or agriculture. Therefore, I include
average agriculture production (% of GDP) from 1970 to 2008 as an explanatory variable
(World Bank, World Development Indicators).
Table III.2., Model 3B shows the regression results from including the
explanatory variables suggested by the theory. The coefficient on initial GDP is positive
and significant, and it has not significantly changed from Model 1B, which included
7
Ideally, it would be better if the data on percentage of roads paved were available before 1990, but it is
probably safe to assume that the relative differences across nations in infrastructure between 1990-2008 is
approximately the same as it was 20 years prior.
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institutions as the only other explanatory variable. An additional $100 in initial GDP is
associated with an increase of $3.20 in capital inflows, even after controlling for the
additional variables. The coefficient on institutions has remained nearly the same from
Model 1B, and it remains insignificant. Besides initial GDP, the only other variable with
a significant coefficient is Distance, which has the expected negative sign. It is possible
that some of the other variables are important but correlated with other covariates,
diminishing the significance of that variable. Multiple regressions can show that this is
not a large problem. However, we can compare the adjusted R-squared in Model 1B or
Model 1A to Model 3B to see that there is only an improvement of 0.04, which means
that including all of the additional variables besides initial GDP explains only a small
additional amount of the variation in capital flows.
Decomposition of Institutional Variables
Using a composite index that includes all the institutional variables, as in the
study by AKV, may not be the proper approach. Although most of the institution
variables are correlated with each other, some institutional variables may have a different
effect on capital flows than other institutional variables. If this is the case, as we will see
that it is, a composite index that includes all of the institutional variables may be a
misleading measurement of institutional quality.

In Table III.3., Model 1C, the

regression includes initial GDP and the individual components (or smaller composites) of
the general composite index of institutions. Initial GDP is still positive and significant at
the 1% level. However, now we see that the variable labeled Property Rights and Legal
Structure and the variable labeled Government Size and Taxes are significantly correlated
with capital inflows. An increase in one point (0-10 scale) in Property Rights and Legal
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Structure is associated with $56.50 more annual capital inflows per capita. Surprisingly,
an increase in one point in Government Size and Taxes, which means a smaller
government and lower taxes, leads to $29.80 less capital inflows per capita.
In Model 2C from Table III.3., the other explanatory variables are added to the
regression. 8 Initial GDP remains positive and significant at the 1% level. The signs for
the coefficients for Property Rights and Legal (positive) and Government Size and Taxes
(negative) have the same sign as in Model 1C. When controlling for the other factors that
affect capital flows, the coefficient on Business Regulations is also positive and
significant. For every one point increase (0-10 scale) in Business Regulations, which
means less regulations or less government interference, annual capital inflows per capita
increases by $31.80. After controlling for the components of institutions, location still
has a significant important impact on capital inflows, as we can see by the negative and
significant coefficient on the Distance variable.
From Model 2C, we can see that all of the institutional variables have a positive
coefficient, except for Government Size and Taxes. Since the institutional variables are
also correlated with each other, in Model 3C I included only the variables with a
significant coefficient from Model 2C. We can see in Model 3C that the coefficients are
almost identical to those in Model 2C. The model explains most of the variation in
capital inflows, as we can see from adjusted R-squared value of 0.775.

8

I excluded schooling here because it is both insignificant and highly correlated with property rights,
making the coefficient on property rights insignificant (barely). If replacing property rights with schooling,
the coefficient on schooling is still insignificant. In order to prevent misleading results of the individual
effects of the components of the institution composite variable, I exclude schooling in this model, but bring
it back in the later regressions.
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The purpose of these estimates has been to explain the phenomenon of increasing
returns, or lack of capital flows to poor countries. However, the persistence of a positive
and significant coefficient on initial GDP per capita shows that the standard theory and
the leading remedies to the standard theory have not fully explained the paradox.
Including institutional variables and location have improved the standard model, but in
contrast to the study by AKV, the effect of initial GDP remains strong when controlling
for these factors. On the other hand, we have seen earlier that it may be inappropriate to
group both poor and rich countries together, since initial GDP and capital inflows may
have a different relationship in each group.

Therefore, I will now compare the

determinants of capital flows for the “poor” countries and the “rich” countries in separate
regressions.
“Rich” vs. “Poor” Countries
We have seen in Figures III.2. and III.3. that there appears to be a break point
around the median income level, where initial GDP and capital inflows go from having a
weak relationship to a strong, positive relationship. If we separate the sample into two
different regressions around the median income level, we can get an idea of the
differences between the two groups. Table III.4. compares the regression from World
sample to the regressions of the divided sample. Because of the smaller sample sizes,
and to compare with two-stage least squares, I create a composite of institutions that is an
average of all of the institutional components except for Government Size and Taxes.
From the previous table in Model 2C, we see that the coefficients of all of the
institutional variables have a positive sign except for Government Size and Taxes.
Therefore, I combine the variables with the same sign, and it will not suffer from the
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problem of the total composite variable, which has components that work in opposite
direction.
In Model 1D from Table III.4., initial GDP, institutions, government size and
taxes, and distance significantly influence capital inflows in the World sample. When we
examine only those countries with initial GDP of less than $2500 in Model 1D, we see
that the significant determinants of capital inflows are not all the same as the significant
determinants of capital inflows in the World sample. For the “poor” countries, initial
GDP does not significantly affect capital inflows. Institutions do have a significant and
positive relationship with capital inflows in the poor group. An increase of one point in
institutions (not including government size and taxes) is associated with an increase in
$7.21 of annual capital inflows per capita. For the poor group, agriculture production as
a percentage of GDP is negatively and significantly correlated with capital inflows.
Government size and taxes does not significantly affect capital inflows in the poor group,
unlike in the World sample. Distance, or remoteness, has the predicted negative sign, just
as in the World sample. In a somewhat surprising result, being landlocked significantly
increases capital inflows per capita in the poor group, controlling for the other
explanatory variables. Of course, given such a small sample size, and controlling for
income, schooling, infrastructure, and remoteness, one or two observations may
significantly affect the coefficient of the landlocked dummy variable.
In Model 3D from Table III.4., I examine the determinants of capital inflows for
those countries with initial GDP of greater than $2500. In the “rich” group, initial GDP
does not significantly affect capital inflows, just as in the case with the “poor” group. For
the rich countries, institutions (excluding government size and taxes) are positively and
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significantly correlated with capital inflows. An increase in one point (0-10 scale) in
institutional quality (or freedom) increases annual capital inflows per capita by almost
$100. For the rich countries, an increase in government size and taxes is associated with
an increase in capital inflows. For example, an increase of one point in government size
and taxes (which means less government or lower taxes), brings down average annual
capital flows by $89.60. Remoteness or distance does not affect capital inflows for the
rich countries, controlling for other factors.
We can see significant differences and similarities comparing determinants of
capital inflows in the “poor” group with the determinants of capital inflows in the “rich”
group. Within each group, initial GDP does not significantly influence capital inflows,
controlling for other factors. In other words, we do not see increasing returns or the
Lucas Paradox within each group; we only see increasing returns when looking at the
entire sample. The poor countries receive less capital inflows if they produce more
agriculture (% of GDP), while capital inflows in the rich countries are not significantly
influenced by the amount of agriculture. Capital inflows in the poor countries are not
significantly influenced by government size and taxes, but smaller government and lower
taxes in the rich countries is negatively correlated with capital inflows. Both the rich
countries and the poor countries benefit strongly from institutional quality or freedom.
Remoteness is a significant factor for the poor countries, but it is not significant for the
rich countries.
Multicollinearity
Institutions and initial GDP are strongly correlated. A regression shows, for
instance, that the variation in initial GDP explains over half the variation in institutional
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quality (excluding government size and taxes). In the study by AKV, they find that
initial GDP does not significantly affect capital inflows after controlling for institutions,
and they argue that it does not because of multicollinearity. In their study, the composite
institutional variable comes from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), which I
argue is more dependent on initial GDP than a measurement of economic “freedom.” In
fact, we have seen that an increase in economic freedom regarding government size and
taxes significantly decreases capital flows. The fact that there is multicollinearity should
diminish the significance of the coefficient of initial GDP and/or institutions, but we see
that in the entire sample, the coefficients for both variables remain significant.
To illustrate my point of the independent effects of initial GDP and institutions,
and to compare my study to that of AKV, I graph the independent effects of initial GDP
and institutions in Figures III.4a. and III.4b. In Figure III.4a., I take the residuals from
the regression of capital flows on institutions against the residuals from the regression of
initial GDP on institutions. The Frisch-Waugh Theorem says that the coefficient from
this regression equals the coefficient for initial GDP in a regression with initial GDP and
institutions as the explanatory variables, which equals 0.035. We can easily see from
Figure III.4a. that there is a positive relationship between initial GDP and capital inflows
per capita, even when controlling for institutions. While the variance does increase some,
the sign of the coefficient is not driven by a few observations. In Figure III.4b., in a
similar procedure, I graph the effect of institutions on capital inflows per capita,
controlling for initial GDP. Institutions are also positively and significantly correlated
with capital inflows, with a coefficient of 51.12, when controlling for initial GDP.
However, this result is very different from that of AKV. Initial GDP appears to have a
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strong independent effect, unlike the result from AKV, and the independent effect of
institutions shown in Figure III.4b seems more sensitive to outlier observations than the
coefficient on initial GDP.
Robustness
The purpose of this study has been to examine increasing returns and identify the
possible reasons for the lack of capital flows to poor countries. Throughout all the
regressions using the entire sample, the coefficient on initial GDP has remained
significant. Introducing other relevant variables that may affect capital flows, such as
controlling for diseases or tropics, does not significantly change the coefficient on initial
GDP. However, one may argue that GDP in 1970 picks up too many unobservable
conditions that affect capital flows near that year. One way of testing the robustness of
initial GDP is to only look at capital flows from 1990 to 2008. This procedure would
leave a 20-year gap between the initial GDP and where capital inflows begin to be
measured. In Table III.5., I run the same regressions as in Table III.4., except I use
average annual capital inflows per capita from 1990 to 2008 instead of from 1970 to
2008. The results from Table III.5. are very similar to the results from Table III.4.
In Model 1E from Table III.5., we can see that the coefficient on initial GDP is
positive and significant. In fact, all of the variables that were significant in Model 1D
from Table III.4. are also significant in Model 1E from Table III.5. The coefficients are
larger in Table III.5., which is expected given the increase in capital flows throughout the
years. Models 2E and 3E from Table III.5. also yields similar results as Models 2D and
3D from Table III.4. These results suggest that there is a strong case for increasing
returns throughout the entire sample, but we do not see evidence of increasing returns if
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we only focus on the poor or on the rich countries. As will be discussed later, this may
suggest that there is a threshold or set of conditions that countries must possess in order
to attract high levels of capital flows.
III.III. Instrumental Variable Estimates
In this section, as in the study by AKV, I look at the possibility of a reverse
causality, where capital inflows may influence institutional quality. I argue that the data
from the Economic Freedom Report may be subjected to less endogeneity than the
dataset used by AKV (International Country Risk Guide). The data from the Economic
Freedom Report measures the amount of economic freedom in each variable, while the
ICRG measures risk. While these measures may be similar, if constructing a dataset of
institutions based on risk, one may naturally be inclined to assign better values to those
countries that are attracting a high level of capital inflows. While it is possible that a
dataset based on economic freedom may suffer from the same problem, the intuition for
such a problem does not seem as strong as it does with the ICRG data.
However, to be sure that endogeneity is not a problem, I instrument institutions
(not including government size or taxes) with log European settler mortality, as in
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001). The argument for settler mortality as an
instrument is that if European colonists could safely settle in a particular location, they
setup better institutions with an emphasis on property rights and checks against
government power, such as in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the U.S.

If

settlement was difficult or dangerous, such as in places with a high rate of disease, the
colonists were more likely to set up an extractive state with less emphasis on property
rights. In Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), they use log European settler
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mortality to see the effects of institutions on economic growth, but I will use it to see the
effects of institutions on capital inflows.
First, I test to see if log European settler mortality is a valid instrument for my
regressions. In order for the variable to be a valid instrument, it must be significantly
correlated with institutions, but it should not independently be correlated with capital
inflows. Because of the small sample size, only initial GDP, institutions (not including
government size and taxes), and government size and taxes are included as explanatory
variables.

In Model 1F from Table III.6., we see that log settler mortality is not

correlated with capital inflows when controlling for initial GDP and the institutional
variables in the World sample. In Model 2F, we see that log European setter mortality is
correlated with institutions, when controlling for initial GDP and government size and
taxes. Therefore, log settler European mortality is a valid instrument for the World
sample case. When we look at the “poor” sample and the “rich” sample, we can see that
log European settler mortality also meets the conditions to be a valid instrument.
In Table III.7., two-stage least squares is performed replacing institutions with its
estimate derived from using log settler mortality as an instrument. In Model 1G, which is
the entire available sample, we see similar results as before; initial GDP, institutions, and
government size and taxes are all significant factors that influence capital inflows. The
adjusted R-squared of .827 shows that the variables explain nearly all of the variation in
the capital inflows. Two-stage least square do lead to different results for the poor group.
In Model 2G, we see that institutions do not play a significant role in attracting capital
inflows for the poor countries, but initial GDP is a significant factor. For the poor
countries, the model does not explain the variation in capital inflows as well as the model
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for the rich sample or the World sample. For the rich group, institutions and government
size and taxes are significant factors as they were in the OLS results. However, with the
IV estimation, initial GDP is also a significant factor for the rich group. In the OLS
estimation, initial GDP was near the significance threshold for the rich group, so the twostage least squares estimates are not very different than the OLS results. Overall, the IV
estimates do not significantly differ from the OLS estimates.

If anything, it has

confirmed the results that initial GDP and institutions matter for capital inflows.
III.IV. Summary and Conclusions
The purpose of this study has been to test the prevailing theories that attempt to
explain the lack of capital flows to poor countries. In particular, this study has served as
a contrast to that of Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych (2008), who concluded that
different institutions solved the Lucas Paradox. Without any doubt, institutions play a
key role in attracting capital flows; however, it does not eliminate the existence of
increasing returns. Not only are the results by AKV sensitive to the institutional dataset,
but also their choice to use the logarithm of GDP instead of the levels may have played a
role in its insignificance. Nevertheless, this paper attempts to provide an explanation for
increasing returns by including institutional variables and other factors that affect capital
inflows.
Surprisingly, even when incorporating additional factors that may influence
capital flows, such as human capital, infrastructure, and geography, the paradox of
increasing returns remains. I then took a simple approach, in contrast to previous studies,
and I separated the sample to see if we can explain increasing returns by comparing the
“poor” countries with the “rich” countries. Graphically, from Figures III.2. and III.3., we
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have seen that there is a break point around the initial GDP level of $2500.
Conveniently, this break was around the median income level, which allowed us to divide
the sample in half and have enough observations on each side to compare regressions.
When comparing the “poor” countries to the “rich” countries, we have seen that the
variables affect capital inflows differently in each group.

For instance, agriculture

production is negatively correlated with capital inflows for the poor group, but
agricultural production is not a significant factor in the rich group. However, another
surprise was that the coefficient on initial GDP was not significant within each group.
These results may help provide another explanation for the Lucas Paradox. Poor
countries may find it difficult to compete for capital flows until they reach a certain
threshold income level. Once they achieve such a threshold, or when they join the “rich”
group, they will receive significantly more capital flows than what a country receives in
the “poor” group. However, when a country is in the “rich” group, an increase in capital
alone will not induce more capital flows. The significance of the agriculture variable in
the poor group may suggest that this relates to industrialization. These results may
support the poverty trap or “big push” theories (for instance, see Azariadis, Costas, and
Stachurski (2004), and Murphy, et. al. (1989)). This may also give empirical support to
the movement towards a bimodal world income distribution (Quah 1996), where rich,
industrialized countries may attract more capital flows than poor countries.
Policymakers can certainly derive from these results the benefits of quality
property rights, regulations, and legal structure. The impact of foreign aid, however, is
not so clear. If the aid is big enough, so that the country becomes industrialized, the
country may receive significantly more capital flows. If the aid is not large, then the
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receiving country may not receive additional capital flows. Remoteness also seems to
play a key role in deterring capital flows, but how a policy can improve remoteness is
beyond the scope of this paper.
Lastly, this paper may have created more questions than it answered.

For

instance, one surprising and robust result is that countries with a large government and
high income tax rate, attract more capital flows than countries with a smaller government
and lower taxes. This may be further explored in future research. The most pressing
issue, however, is to empirically identify the source of increasing returns. This paper
shows that increasing returns cannot easily be explained away, but it cannot specify with
certainty the reason why increasing returns exists.
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Figure III.1. Capital Inflows and Initial GDP
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Notes: Figure III.1. graphs the regression of capital inflows on GDP per capita in 1970.
Capital Inflows are measured as average annual per capita values of Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) plus Portfolio Investment from 1970 to 2008. The data is obtained
from the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) International Financial Statistics (IFS).
GDP in 1970 is obtained from Penn World Tables version 6.1. All values are in constant
1996 dollars. See the appendix for more details on the data.
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Figure III.2a. Capital Inflows and Initial GDP (<2500)
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Notes: Figure III.2a. graphs the regression of capital inflows on GDP per capita in 1970
for only those countries with GDP of less than $2500. Capital Inflows are measured as
average annual per capita values of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) plus Portfolio
Investment from 1970 to 2008. The data is obtained from the International Monetary
Fund’s (IMF) International Financial Statistics (IFS). GDP in 1970 is obtained from
Penn World Tables version 6.1. All values are in constant 1996 dollars. See the
appendix for more details on the data.
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Figure III.2b. Capital Inflows and Initial GDP (>2500)
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Notes: Figure III.2b. graphs the regression of capital inflows on GDP per capita in 1970,
for only those countries with a GDP greater than $2500. Capital Inflows are measured as
average annual per capita values of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) plus Portfolio
Investment from 1970 to 2008. The data is obtained from the International Monetary
Fund’s (IMF) International Financial Statistics (IFS). GDP in 1970 is obtained from
Penn World Tables version 6.1. All values are in constant 1996 dollars. See the
appendix for more details on the data.
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Figure III.3. Poor and Rich Countries
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Notes: Figure III.3. graphs a quadratic regression fit of capital inflows on GDP per capita
in 1970. The sample is divided where GDP equals $2500, and a quadratic regression is
fitted for both sides of the threshold. Capital Inflows are measured as average annual per
capita values of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) plus Portfolio Investment from 1970 to
2008. The data is obtained from the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) International
Financial Statistics (IFS). GDP in 1970 is obtained from Penn World Tables version 6.1.
All values are in constant 1996 dollars. See the appendix for more details on the data.
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Figure III.4a. Capital Inflows and Initial GDP, Controlling for Institutions
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Notes: In Figure III.4a., I take the residuals from the regression of capital inflows on
institutions (not including government size and taxes) against the residuals from the
regression of initial GDP on institutions. The Frisch-Waugh theorem says the coefficient
from this regression equals the coefficient for initial GDP in a regression with initial GDP
and institutions as the explanatory variables, which equals 0.035. The purpose of this
graph is to observe the effect of initial GDP on capital inflows, controlling for
institutional quality. For a description of the institutional variables, please see the
appendix.
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Figure III.4b. Capital Inflows and Institutions, Controlling for Initial GDP
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Notes: In Figure III.4b., I take the residuals from the regression of capital inflows on
initial GDP against the residuals from the regression of institutions on initial GDP. The
Frisch-Waugh theorem says the coefficient from this regression equals the coefficient for
institutions in a regression with initial GDP and institutions as the explanatory variables,
which equals 51.12. The purpose of this graph is to observe the effect of institutional
quality on capital inflows, controlling for institutional quality. For a description of the
institutional variables, please see the index.
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Table III.1. Capital Inflows and Initial GDP
Dependent Variable is Average Annual Capital Inflows Per Capita 1970-2008
Variable

Model 1A

GDP Per Capita in 1970 (Entire Sample)

0.0447***

Model 2A

Model 3A

(0.0032)
GDP Per Capita in 1970 (Poorest Half)

0.00936**
(0.0041)

GDP Per Capita in 1970 (Richest Half)

0.0474***
(0.0065)

Constant

Adjusted R-Squared
Countries

-55.4***

0.451

-80.6

(19.6)

(6.27)

(54.7)

0.643

0.0769

0.495

107

53

54

Standard errors are in parentheses. ***1%, **5%, *10%. See the appendix for a
description of the variables.
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Table III.2. Determinants of Capital Inflows (World Sample)
Dependent Variable is Average Annual Capital Inflows Per Capita 1970-2008
Variable
Model 1B
Model 2B
Model 3B
GDP Per Capita in 1970 (Entire Sample)
0.0403***
0.0319***
(0.0044)
(0.0062)
Institutions
34.1
151***
36.6
(22.6)
(20.6)
(25.5)
Schooling
10.5
(9.71)
Roads Paved (%)
0.494
(0.619)
Distance
-0.0155**
(0.0069)
Landlocked (not in Europe)
51.7
(47.5)
Agriculture (% of GDP)
1.45
(1.76)
Constant
-235**
-735***
-261*
(120)
(122)
(152)
Adjusted R-Squared
Countries

0.647
101

0.289
131

0.687
84

Standard errors are in parentheses. ***1%, **5%, *10%. See the appendix for a
description of the variables.
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Table III.3. Capital Inflows and Institutions (World Sample)
Dependent Variable is Average Annual Capital Inflows Per Capita 1970-2008
Variable
Model 1C
Model 2C
Model 3C
GDP Per Capita in 1970 (Entire Sample)

Constant

-170
(118)

.0234***
(.0053)
36.3**
(15.4)
-38.4***
(11.9)
4.61
(16.5)
6.77
(9.77)
31.8*
(18.2)
-.183
(.554)
-.0146***
(.0057)
19.6
(35.9)
.795
(1.36)
-136
(128)

Adjusted R-Squared
Countries

.707
101

.756
94

Property Rights and Legal Structure
Government Size and Taxes
Trade Freedom
Sound Money
Business Regulations

.0248***
(.0053)
56.5***
(16)
-29.8**
(12.8)
-11.3
(16.9)
9.2
(10.4)
15.4
(19)

Roads Paved (%)
Distance
Landlocked (not in Europe)
Agriculture (% of GDP)

.0229***
(.0044)
36.6***
(13.4)
-37.5***
(10.7)

36.6**
(16.7)

-.0132***
(.0048)

-91.7
(92.7)
.775
96

Standard errors are in parentheses. ***1%, **5%, *10%. See the appendix for a
description of the variables.
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Table III.4. Poor and Rich Countries
Dependent Variable is Average Annual Capital Inflows Per Capita 1970-2008
Variable
Model 1D
Model 2D
Model 3D
GDP Per Capita in 1970 (Entire Sample)

0.0241***
(0.0058)

GDP Per Capital in 1970 (Poorest Half)

0.0003
(0.0045)

GDP Per Capital in 1970 (Richest Half)
Institutions (not incl. Gov. size/taxes)
Schooling
Agriculture (% of GDP)
Roads Paved (%)
Government Size and Taxes
Landlocked (not in Europe)
Distance
Constant

Adjusted R-Squared
Countries

66***
(20)
6.08
(8.68)
0.95
(1.58)
-0.354
(0.58)
-50.4***
(12.6)
18.6
(42.8)
-0.0111*
(0.0062)
-51.5
(137)

7.21**
(3.55)
1.33
(1.36)
-0.784***
(0.235)
0.147
(0.105)
-2.87
(2.24)
14.4***
(5.29)
-0.00258*
(0.0014)
17
(27)

0.0156
(0.0109)
99.4***
(39.1)
0.698
(18.8)
-0.947
(5.68)
-0.74
(1.05)
-89.6***
(26.2)
171
(189)
-0.00582
(0.0105)
73.4
(249)

0.752
84

0.601
41

0.682
43

Standard errors are in parentheses. ***1%, **5%, *10%. See the appendix for a
description of the variables.
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Table III.5. Robustness of Initial GDP
Dependent Variable is Average Annual Capital Inflows Per Capita 1990-2008
Model 1E
Model 2E
Model 3E
Variable
GDP Per Capita in 1970 (Entire Sample)

0.041***
(0.0104)
0.00048

GDP Per Capita in 1970(Poorest Half)

(0.0075)
0.0315

GDP Per Capita in 1970 (Richest Half)

(0.0189)
Institutions (not incl. Gov. size/taxes)
Schooling
Agriculture (% of GDP)
Roads Paved (%)
Government Size and Taxes
Landlocked (not in Europe)
Distance
Constant

Adjusted R-Squared
Countries

116***

6.8

171***

(36.4)

(6.16)

(67.9)

5.68

3.81*

-9.19

(15.4)

(2.26)

(32.7)

1.12

-0.883**

-2.4

(2.97)

(0.41)

(9.88)

-0.666

0.353**

-1.36

(1.02)

(0.175)

(1.82)

-92.6***

1.31

-161***

(22.9)

(3.87)

(45.6)

49.5

20.2**

348

(78.6)

(9.05)

(328)

-0.0181*

-0.00452*

-0.00889

(0.011)

(0.0023)

(0.0182)

-53.9

-1.18

177

(242)

(44.8)

(433)

0.74

0.545

0.68

83

40

43

Standard errors are in parentheses. ***1%, **5%, *10%. See the appendix for a
description of the variables.
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Table III.6. Testing for Validity of the Instrumental Variable
For Models 1F, 3F, and 5F the dependent variable is average annual capital inflows. For Models 2F, 4F,
and 6F, the dependent variable is Institutions (excluding government size/taxes)
Dependent
Variable:

Capital
Inflows

Institutions

Capital
Inflows

Institutions

Variable

Model 1F

Model 2F

Model 3F

Model 4F

GDP Per Capita
in 1970 (Entire
Sample)

.0216***

.00013***

(.0026)

(.00003)
.00914***

0.00031*

(.0029)

(0.00017)

GDP Per Capita
in 1970(Poorest
Half)
GDP Per Capita
in 1970 (Richest
Half)
Institutions (not
incl. Gov.
size/taxes)
Government Size
and Taxes
Log Settler
Mortality
Constant

Adjusted RSquared
Countries

Capital
Inflows

Institutions

Model 5F

Model 6F

0.0192***

0.00011**

(0.0043)

(0.000049)

46.6***

1.81

62.6***

(10.2)

(3.31)

(16.4)

-15.4**

.17**

2.77

0.163

-25.1**

0.154

(6.35)

(.0822)

(1.86)

(0.113)

(10.5)

(0.127)

3.23

-.271***

-.761

-0.178*

-8.7

-0.46**

(7.27)

(.0907)

(1.59)

(0.0937)

(17.6)

(0.199)

-188**

5.23***

-25.9

4.56***

-167

6.22***

(76.1)

(.726)

(20.8)

(0.874)

(150)

(1.38)

.824

.534

.305

0.19

0.814

0.469

61

62

33

34

28

28

Standard errors are in parentheses. ***1%, **5%, *10%. See the appendix for a
description of the variables.
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Table III.7. Two-Stage Least Squares
Dependent Variable is Average Annual Capital Inflows Per Capita 1970-2008. Institutions (not incl.
Gov. size/taxes) is instrumented with Log Settler Mortality
Variable

Model 1G

GDP Per Capita in 1970 (Entire Sample)

0.0213***

Model 2G

Model 3G

(0.0025)
GDP Per Capita in 1970 (Poorest Half)

0.00926***
(0.0028)

GDP Per Capita in 1970 (Richest Half)

0.0199***
(0.004)

Institutions (not incl. Gov. size/taxes)

44.9***

2.38277

66.04***

(9.41)

(3.04)

(14.58)

Government Size and Taxes

-15.3**

2.64

-25**

(6.3)

(1.81)

(10.3)

-164***

-32.2**

-228***

(51.5)

(15.9)

(84.7)

0.827

0.323

0.82

61

33

28

Constant

Adjusted R-Squared
Countries

Standard errors are in parentheses. ***1%, **5%, *10%. See the appendix for a
description of the variables.
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APPENDICES
Appendix for Chapter I.
Proposition: With diminishing returns to investment, in response to capital account
liberalization, savings will flow from the Rich to the Poor country; reverse flows cannot
take place.
Proof : To prove this, I need to show that richer economies have lower interest rates in
autarky under diminishing returns than poor economies.

In autarky, investment per

entrepreneur is equal to the total income of the country per entrepreneur, I =

y1
. The
1− s

equilibrium interest rate in autarky is the rate which satisfies both the incentive constraint
of

the

borrowers

P( Z ) = Z −

and

the

zero-profit

condition

of

the

lenders,

where

R
R( I − Y1 )
. Solving for R and substituting for investment, we have
=
π '(I )
π (I )
−1





sy1
1


R = Z
+
, which is the same as equation (11). Taking the
 y1 
 y1  
 (1 − s )π 
 π ' 
 

 (1 − s ) 
 (1 − s )  

derivative with respect to the endowment income we have

 s(1 − s)π ( I ) − sy π ' ( I )
π ''(I )

1
−
2

∂R
[(1 − s)π ( I )]
(1 − s )π ' ( I ) 2
= −Z 
2
∂y1
 sI
1 



+

π
π
(
I
)
'
(
I
)







,




which is negative if s (1 − s )π ( I ) − sy1π ' ( I ) > 0 . Dividing by s (1 − s ) , the inequality can
be written as π ( I ) > π ' ( I ) I , which is will always be true under diminishing returns. This
completes the proof.
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Under increasing returns, one can easily use the same proof to show that it is possible to
have

∂R
> 0 . Since the autarkic interest rate in the Rich country may be higher than that
∂y1

of the Poor country, capital, therefore, can flow from the Poor to the Rich as we go from
autarky to free international capital flows.
Appendix for Chapter II.
To illustrate the results from the figures, the following production functions were used:
F ( K 2N ) = 6( K 2N )1/ 3 ,
and

F ( K 2M ) =

25( K 2M )13 / 6
.
( K 2M ) 2 + 500

Other similar functions can be used as well. I used an interest rate of 0.10. To illustrate
the results under collateral differences across sectors, I set z = 0.07 and n = 0.27 (for the
initial results, I set both parameters equal).
The variable of interest is the initial income, Y1 , and how it affects the equilibrium debt
and output. The value of default is given in equation (7) and the value of repayment is
given in equation (8). To solve for the equilibrium debt level, and to construct Figure
II.9., I set the value of default equal to the value of repayment at different initial income
levels. To construct Figures II.10. and II.11., initial income and debt is given, so insert
( Y1 + D2 − K 2M ) in the place of K 2N in the value functions.
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Appendix for Chapter III.
Data Description and Sources
Capital Inflows: Average annual per capita values of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
and Portfolio Investment from 1970 to 2008. The data is obtained from the International
Monetary Fund’s (IMF) International Financial Statistics (IFS). As a measure of FDI, I
use Foreign direct investment in reporting economy, n.i.e. (IFS line 78bed). Direct
investment includes equity capital, reinvested earnings, other capital, and financial
derivatives associated with various intercompany transactions between affiliated
enterprises measured in current U.S. dollars. As a measure of portfolio investment, I use
Equity securities liabilities (IFS line 78bmd), which includes flows of shares, stock
participations, and similar documents that denote ownership of equity measured in
current U.S. dollars. (The IMF classifies direct investment as involving ownership of at
least 10 percent of the local firm’s equity. Other equity purchases are included in this
category.) I express the inflows in constant 1996 U.S. dollars, and to convert to per
capita measures I divide by the population in each year.
Population:

1970-2008.

Total population from World Bank, World Development

Indicators, 2009.
Consumer Price Index (CPI): U.S. CPI with base year 1996 = 1. CPI with a base year of
2005 was obtained from World Bank, World Development Indicators, but it was adjusted
to 1996.
Real GDP Per Capita: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in 1970 in constant
1996 dollars obtained from Penn World Tables version 6.1.
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Institutional variables: For the institutional variables, I take advantage of the dataset
compiled in the Economic Freedom of the World 2009 Annual Report (which can be
found at www.freetheworld.com). Each variable is given a value from 0 to 10. Generally
speaking, a higher number represents more freedom or less restriction. I take the average
of each variable from 1970 to 2005, where equal weight is put on each five-year interval.
The following provides the components of each institutional variable, but for a detailed
description of each variable, please see the appendix of the Economic Freedom report.
•

Institutions: A composite variable, which is the average of all the other
institutional variables.

•

Institutions (not including government size and taxes): A composite variable,
which is the average of all the other institutional variables, except Size of
Government: Expenditures, Taxes, and Enterprises.

•

Size of Government: Expenditures, Taxes, and Enterprises (I labeled as
Government Size and Taxes): A composite variable, which is the average of the
following variables:
o General government consumption spending as a percentage of total
consumption
o Transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP
o Government enterprises and investment
o Top marginal tax rate


Top marginal income tax rate



Top marginal income and payroll tax rates
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•

Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights (I labeled as Property Rights and
Legal Structure): A composite variable, which is the average of the following
variables
o Judicial independence
o Impartial courts
o Protection of property rights
o Military interference in rule of law and the political process
o Integrity of the legal system
o Legal enforcement of contracts
o Regulatory restrictions on the sale of real property

•

Access to Sound Money (I labeled as Sound Money): A composite variable that is
the average of the following variables:
o Money growth
o Standard deviation of inflation
o Inflation: Most recent year
o Freedom to own foreign currency bank accounts

•

Freedom to Trade Internationally (I labeled as Trade Freedom): A composite
variable that is the average of the following variables:
o Taxes on international trade


Revenues from trade taxes (% of trade sector)



Mean tariff rate



Standard deviation of tariff rates

o Regulatory Trade Barriers
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Non-tariff trade barriers



Compliance cost of importing and exporting

o Size of the trade sector relative to expected
o Black-market exchange rates
o International capital market controls

•



Foreign ownership / investment restrictions



Capital controls

Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business (I labeled as Business Regulation): A
composite variable that is the average of the following variables:
o Credit market regulations


Ownership of banks



Foreign bank competition



Private sector credit



Interest rate controls / negative real interest rates

o Labor market regulations


Minimum wage



Hiring and firing regulations



Centralized collective bargaining



Mandated cost of hiring



Mandated cost of worker dismissal



Conscription

o Business Regulations


Price controls

131



Administrative requirements



Bureaucracy costs



Starting a business



Extra payments / bribes



Licensing restrictions



Cost of tax compliance

Schooling: Average years of total schooling for age 25 and older from years 1970, 1975,
1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000. Data from Barro, Robert J. and Jong-Wha Lee (2000),
“International Data on Educational Attainment: Updates and Implications,” Center for
International Development at Harvard University (CID) Working Paper No. 42, April
2000.
Roads Paved (%): Percentage of total roads that are paved, average from 1990-2008.
Data from World Bank, World Development Indicators.
Agriculture: Agriculture value added, percentage of GDP. Average from 1970-2008.
World Bank, World Development Indicators.
Landlocked, not in Europe: Indicator for landlocked country, excluding countries in
Western and Central Europe (Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Slovakia, and Switzerland). Includes Eastern European
countries of Belarus and Moldova. Data obtained from Gallup, John L. and Jeffrey D.
Sachs, with Andrew Mellinger, "Geography and Economic Development" (CID Working
Paper No. 1, March 1999).
Distance: Air distance in kilometers to one of the three capital-goods-supplying regions:
the U.S., Western Europe, and Japan, specifically measured as distance from the
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country’s capital city to New York, Rotterdam, or Tokyo. Data obtained from Gallup,
John L. and Jeffrey D. Sachs, with Andrew Mellinger, "Geography and Economic
Development" (CID Working Paper No. 1, March 1999).
Log European Settler Mortality:
mortality rates from

The logarithm of the historical European settler’s

Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001).

Mortality rates are

deaths per annum per 1000.

Table III.8. Data Samples.
List of countries from selected tables. The list shows the fullest sample in each table.
Some countries fall out of other regressions because of data availability.
Table III.1
(107 Countries)

Table III.2.
(131)

Table III.6.
(61)

Algeria
Angola

Malaysia
Mali

Albania
Algeria

Jamaica
Japan

Argentina
Australia
Austria
Bangladesh
Barbados

Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Morocco
Mozambique

Angola
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Austria

Benin
Bolivia
Botswana

Azerbaijan, Rep.
Bahamas, The
Bahrain, King.

Brazil

Namibia
Nepal
Netherlands
New
Zealand

Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Korea, Rep.
Kuwait
Kyrgyz
Republic
Latvia
Lesotho

Burkina Faso
Burundi

Nicaragua
Niger

Barbados
Belize

Lithuania
Macedonia,
FYR
Madagascar

Cameroon
Canada
Cape Verde
Central Afr.
Rep.
Chad

Nigeria
Norway
Pakistan

Benin
Bolivia
Bosnia & Herz.

Malawi
Malaysia
Mali

Panama
Papua N.G.

Botswana
Brazil

Malta
Mauritania

Chile
China
(Mainland)
Comoros
Congo, Rep.

Paraguay

Bulgaria

Mauritius

Costa Rica
Côte d'Ivoire
Dominican
Rep.

Peru
Philippines
Poland

Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon

Mexico
Moldova
Mongolia

Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador

Bangladesh
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Uganda
Ukraine
United
Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Venezuela
Vietnam

Algeria
Angola

Zambia
Zimbabwe

Bolivia
Brazil
Burkina Faso

Argentina
Australia
Bangladesh
Barbados
Benin

Burundi
Cameroon
Canada
Central Afr.
Rep.
Chad
Chile

Costa Rica

Portugal

Côte d'Ivoire
Cyprus
Denmark

Romania
Rwanda
Senegal

Dom.Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Equat. Guinea
Ethiopia

Seychelles
Sierra Leone
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sweden
Syrian Arab
Rep.
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Trin.and
Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
United
Kingdom
United
States
Uruguay
Venezuela
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Fiji
Finland
France
Gabon
Gambia, The
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Hungary
Iceland

Canada
Central Afr.
Rep.
Chad
Chile
China
(Mainland)
Colombia
Congo, Rep.
Costa Rica
Côte d'Ivoire
Croatia

Morocco

Ethiopia

Mozambique
Myanmar
Namibia

Fiji
Gabon
Ghana

Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria

Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
India
Indonesia

Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Dom. Rep

Norway
Oman
Pakistan
Panama

Jamaica
Kenya
Madagascar
Malaysia

Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Estonia

Papua N. G.
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines

Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico

Ethiopia

Poland

Morocco

Fiji
Finland
France
Gabon
Georgia
Germany
Ghana

Portugal
Romania
Russian Fed.
Rwanda
Senegal
Serbia, Rep.
Sierra Leone
Slovak
Republic
Slovenia
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sweden
Syrian Arab,
Rep.
Tanzania

New Zealand
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Pakistan
Panama
Papua N.G.

India
Indonesia
Iran, I.R. of
Israel
Italy
Jamaica

Greece
Guatemala
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras

Japan
Jordan

Hungary
Iceland

Kenya
Korea, Rep.

India
Indonesia

Lesotho
Madagascar
Malawi

Iran, I.R. of
Israel
Italy

Thailand
Togo
Trin.and
Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
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Paraguay
Peru
Rwanda
Senegal
Sierra Leone
South Africa
Sri Lanka
Tanzania
Trin. and
Tobago
Tunisia
Uganda
United States
Venezuela
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